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ABSTRACT
Ordinary Least Squares regression was used to test models of supply and demand for both
owner- and renter-occupied housing in four metropolitan statistical areas: Atlanta, Boston,
Detroit, and Houston. It was hoped that consistent results in estimation of the model at the four
metropolitan areas would lend credibility to the applied theory as well as provide economists,
financiers, and developers alike with a framework within which to make rational decisions.
Demand model regression results indicate that user costs, stock, and lagged price have clear
influences on demand for both owner- and renter-occupied housing in all four MSAs, while the
effects of demographic variables are far less consistent and significant. Results also indicate that
demand for owner-occupied housing does not have the expected impact on the demand for
renter-occupied housing in each of the four MSAs.
Supply models provide far less satisfying results, with low goodness-of-fit statistics and
significance levels. Results indicate that price, lagged price, and lagged permits are strong
determinants of owner-occupied housing supply. Exogenous economic variables representing
changes in construction costs and the costs of short-term borrowing have far less obvious effect.
Renter-occupied supply models provide generally better goodness of fit statistics and consistent
relationships with rent, lagged rent, and lagged permit issuance. However, as in estimation of
ownership supply, measures of construction and interest costs generate disappointing and
inconsistent results. In addition, the effect of the government's production of rental units
demonstrates a surprisingly weak and inconsistent relationship to changes in total renter-
occupied housing stock.
Data problems as well as the possible inappropriateness of applying a single economic model to
diverse metropolitan areas are possible explanations for mixed demand and supply model results.
Thesis Supervisor: William C. Wheaton
Title: Professor of Economics
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1. Introduction
1.1 Statement qf the Problem
Residential real estate cycles are a fixture of the American economy. Most recently, in the
1980s, developers and financiers sought to capitalize upon real estate appreciation they expected
to occur well into the future, generating a building boom of record size. However, these
expectations, often no more than a feeling or a product of past experiences, seriously
miscalculated both supply and demand, resulting in oversupply and subsequent financial losses.
Many economists argue that rational decision-making can prevent such damaging speculative
cycles. They believe that variables determined both inside and outside of the housing market can
be used to construct models that predict equilibrium levels of supply and demand, which can in-
turn be used for rational real estate development decision-making.
1.2 Objectives / Purpose
This paper seeks to apply and test economic theory about the operation of housing markets
within the United States. This starts with understanding the legacy of research that has
contributed to beliefs about the various determinants of housing supply and demand. Once
theory is reviewed, the most recent models of housing market operation (those proposed by
Denise DiPasquale and William Wheaton) are slightly adapted to attempt to solve several
weaknesses in them. Finally, in order to test the accuracy and usefulness of the models in
predicting supply and demand at the local level, the model is applied to data from four diverse
metropolitan areas. It is hoped that consistent results in estimation of the model at the four
metropolitan areas will lend credibility to the applied theory as well as provide economists,
financiers, and developers alike with a framework within which to make rational decisions.
1.3 Thesis Organization and Methodology
The thesis begins (Chapter 2) with a review of economic theory about the operation of
residential real estate markets, explaining shortcomings of previously constructed economic
models. To resolve these problems, a slightly altered economic model is proposed.
This review of the theory unveils two historic disagreements: one over the speed with which the
housing market adjusts to equilibrium, and another over whether markets for owner- and renter-
occupied housing should be considered together or separately. Analysis of previous economic
models demonstrates not only that supply and demand for housing move slowly in relation to
one another, but that estimation of them is improved when distinctions are made between owner-
and renter-occupied housing. As a result, the proposed economic model includes estimation of
supply and demand for both owner- and renter-occupied housing markets. In addition, because
most previous research uses only national data, the model is applied to diverse metropolitan
areas to test its accuracy at the local-market level.
Chapter 3 explains the methodology used to test the proposed model. It starts with a description
of the weaknesses of using Ordinary Least Squares Regression to analyze time series data, and
then describes the criteria used to select the four metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) that were
used to test the model. A description of the sources of data used to estimate supply and demand
as well as adjustments made to this data is then provided. Finally, the chapter describes and
analyzes the results of initial examination of trends in the collected data. This leads to the
conclusion that not only have supply and demand behaved differently and have differing
relationships with their determinants in each of the four MSAs.
Chapters 4 and 5 describe and analyze the results of estimating ownership and rental demand and
supply models with the data from the four MSAs. These results indicate that user costs, stock,
and lagged price have clear influences on demand for both owner- and renter-occupied housing
in all four MSAs, while the effects of demographic variables are far less consistent and
significant. Results also indicate that demand for owner-occupied housing does not have the
expected impact on the demand for renter-occupied housing in each of the four MSAs.
Supply models provide far less satisfying results, with low goodness-of-fit statistics and
significance levels. Results indicate that price, lagged price, and lagged permits are strong
determinants of owner-occupied housing supply. Exogenous economic variables representing
changes in construction costs and the costs of short-term borrowing have far less obvious effect.
Renter-occupied supply models provide generally better goodness of fit statistics and clear and
consistent relationships with rent, lagged rent, and lagged permit issuance. However, as in
estimation of ownership supply, measures of construction and interest costs generate
disappointing and inconsistent results. In addition, the effect of the government's production of
rental units demonstrates a surprisingly weak and inconsistent relationship to changes in total
renter-occupied housing stock.
Finally, the Thesis Conclusion discusses the possible causes of mixed results. More accurate
price, household, and stock data must be used in order to determine if imperfect results are
caused by problems with the data used in this paper or if they are instead caused by the inability
of hypothesized models to explain eccentricities of local housing markets.
2. Survey of Previous Economic Theory and Description of Proposed
Structural Model
2.1 Chapter Introduction
A logical first step towards constructing a theoretically sound, broadly applicable model of
housing supply and demand is understanding previously completed research. This chapter first
reviews existing housing market theory, highlighting historic disagreements as well as the
variables that have been used to construct supply and demand models. Discussion then focuses
on the shortcomings of this historic theory. Finally, the most recently constructed structural
model, that composed by Denise DiPasquale and William Wheaton, is explained, adapted, and
proposed for use in testing modem economic housing market theory at the metropolitan level.
22 Previous Research
Economic research on the housing market has been characterized by three disagreements, two
over theory and one over methodology. First, theory has differed on the speed with which
markets are expected to adjust to equilibrium. Early theory (called Market Equilibrium theory in
this paper) argues that supply and demand for housing adjust instantaneously to changes in the
market. More modem theory (called Stock-Flow theory in this paper) argues that adjustment
takes much longer. Theory also differs over consideration of ownership and rental housing.
Most work treats the market as a monolithic whole, while more modem research asserts that
interactions between supply and demand for rental and ownership housing are important in
explaining the operation of the overall housing market.
In addition to these different theoretical approaches, methodological disagreement about the role
of geography also characterizes previous research. While most authors examine only large
national or regional markets, several have begun testing theory at the metropolitan level instead.
This local application holds great promise in improving the applicability of economic research to
real estate investment decision-making, most of which occurs at the metropolitan level.
2.2.1 Disagreement Over Adjustment to Equilibrium
Early housing economists, particularly those of the 1960s, assert that supply and demand for
housing adjust almost instantaneously to an equilibrium state. These scholars believe that
housing prices link the supply of housing and housing services to those demanding them. Their
theories are based on the assumption that the market's efficiency makes housing supply in one
period equal to that period's demand, and vice versa.
However, modeling this theory was problematic at the time of its inception. Using current price
and current stock generates simultaneous equations, often making it difficult to obtain positive
supply and negative demand elasticities. To avoid this problem, Market Equilibrium theorists
eliminate direct price/stock relationships by solving for them directly. This results in a system of
equations that determine price and stock instead with similar exogenous demographic and
economic variables (Figure 1):
Figure 1
Market Equilibrium Model of Supply and Demand Determination
HOUSING
DEMAND
Curent Price
Exogenous
Economic & PRICEumi
Demographic
Variables
Curent Price
HOUSING
SUPPLY
In Figure 2, supply and demand are connected only through their similar economic and
demographic determinants.
A cornerstone of this Market Equilibrium Theory is a paper by Mankiw and Weil entitled The
Baby Boom, The Baby Bust, and the Housing Market. They assert that US housing demand may
be estimated with the age distribution of the population:
Looking across individuals, the quantity of housing demanded is a function of
age, income, and a variety of other household characteristics. Yet here we use
data on only the first of these attributes: age. Our ultimate goal is to construct a
variable on the aggregate demand for housing given information only on the age
composition of the population. [15]
Simple estimates of changes in the age distribution over time, they assert, can be used to estimate
demand for housing in the future:
Our results indicate that this increase in housing prices was largely attributable
to the aging of the Baby Boom. Over the next twenty years, the Baby Bust
generation will be in its house-buying years... [T]his implies that housing demand
will grow more slowly in the future. [15]
As Market Equilibrium theorists. Mankiw and Weil also hypothesize that the supply of housing
(which they measure in terms of investment) is a function of demographics, determined
simultaneously with demand:
Gross investment in housing is taken to be an increasing function of the [current]
price of housing and proportional to the scale of the economy as measured by the
adult population. [15]
The authors therefore develop a model similar in theory to that presented in Figure 1, with
housing demand and supply determined simultaneously, largely as a product of the same
exogenous demographic variables.
According to the newer Stock-Flow group of theorists, belief in such quick adjustment ignores
the reality of construction lags. These economists argue that, while demand may adjust very
quickly (if not instantaneously) to changes in supply, long lags created by construction periods
prevent supply from adjusting perfectly to demand. Like the Market Equilibrium theorists, these
economists believe that supply and demand affect each other (that is, both are to some extent
determined endogenously). However, because they assert stock is slow to adjust, their models
avoid simultaneity. Instead, while demand, and hence price, adjusts quickly, and is thus partly
determined by the current period's supply, slow-moving supply is determined by prices of at
least one previous period. In addition, because of the slow adjustment of supply to demand, these
theorists argue that a host of other exogenous variables determine supply and demand changes
(Figure 2):
Figure 2
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Several economists, such as James Poterba [17] and J.R. Kearl [13], have pioneered Stock Flow
Theory. However, in their articles entitled The Cost of Capital, Tax Reform, and the Future of
the Rental Housing Market and Housing Market Dynamics and the Future of Housing Prices,
Wheaton and DiPasquale make the clearest case for Stock-Flow revisions. In the latter of the
two articles, they devise a model by which stock adjusts gradually to equilibrium:
To date, spatial theory has used only equilibrium models, in which the stock of
housing always equals the urban population [i.e. supply is determined by
exogenous demographic variables]. Thus, by assumption, the flow of housing
(new construction) equals the growth in population. In effect, there is no
independent supply theory dealing with construction flows ...A simple and quite
straightforward model of housing construction can be created by combining a
stock adjustment process with a long run spatially based definition of the
equilibrium housing stock. [7]
In this model, Wheaton and DiPasquale set current stock equal to a proportion of the equilibrium
stock plus a proportion of the previous period's stock. Though they assume equilibrium stock is
partially determined by current housing prices, the much larger influence of lagged stock is
determined by lagged prices.
Wheaton and DiPasquale also go beyond traditional Stock-Flow theory by asserting that not only
supply (as described above) but also demand adjusts gradually:
[W]e question the traditional.. .assumption that the housing market clears
quickly. Using an explicit test of how rapidly house prices adjust to equilibrium,
we find strong evidence that it takes several years for the market to clear. This
inability of prices to rapidly adjust both supports and helps to explain some of
the recent evidence on the inefficiency of the housing market...[7]
All simultaneity is eliminated from this model of the housing market because both supply and
demand are determined by lagged prices.' The authors present several arguments about the
inefficiency of the pricing mechanism in the residential market as explanations for why this
occurs.
2.2.2 Disagreement Over Housing Tenure
In addition to theories about adjustment to equilibrium, economists have also disagreed about the
role of housing tenure, or the markets for owner- versus renter-occupied housing. Earlier authors
such as Kearl [13] and Poterba [17] did not separate the two markets, arguing that rent and price
(the two most frequently-used proxies of housing demand) are essentially equivalent, being
separated only by a consistent market-determined capitalization rate. These models are similar
to those outlined in Figure 2, in which demand is simply for housing as a whole and is affected
only by supply, interest rates, and other exogenous economic and demographic variables.
Others, such as Wheaton and DiPasquale, have argued that distinction between ownership and
rental markets is important in understanding housing market operation. Wheaton and
DiPasquale assert that households generally prefer to own, but will move to the rental market if
owning becomes too expensive. If this is the case, then increased house prices should increase
demand for rental units, raising rents:
On the one hand, since inflation, interest rates, and tax policy determine the
"cost of homeownership," they affect the demand for rental housing. When
homeownership is inexpensive, as was the case in the mid and late 1970s, then
presumably the demand for rental housing declines. As is shown, real rents did
fall sharply during this period, even as new construction was at historically low
levels. [6]
In their models, owner and renter markets are hypothesized to operate much like the aggregate
markets described in Figure 3. However, these theorists argue that the two markets are
In order to reconcile Figure 2 with this adaptation to theory, the label "Current Price" on the arrow
between price and demand should be replaced with the label "Lagged Price."
connected by a one-way relationship in which ownership housing's affects rents, but not vice
versa:
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As a result of their beliefs about the role of price in determining rent, Wheaton and DiPasquale
include owner-market variables in their estimation of demand for rental housing.
2.2.3 Differences in Treatment of Geography
Tests of economic theory about the operation of the housing market have so far used primarily
national or regional data. For example, Kearl [13], Poterba [17], and others cited in this paper all
test their models at the national level. There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. First, in
their article entitled The Efficiency of the Marketfor Single-Family Homes, Karl Case and Robert
Shiller compare and analyze price data from four cities: Atlanta, Chicago, Dallas, and San
Francisco [3]. However, rather than using Ordinary Least Squares regression to test structural
models they use vector autoregression to determine whether or not the four markets exhibit
efficient pricing. A second exception is work done by Wheaton and DiPasquale in their textbook
The Economics ofReal Estate Markets [8] which tests economic theory about house prices using
Boston data. No scholars have yet compared the results of testing the same structural economic
models on data from several metropolitan areas.
2.3 Variables Used in Constructing Economic Models of the Housing Market
To construct an improved economic model of the housing market, understanding previous theory
itself is insufficient. It is also important to review the dependent and independent variables that
have previously been included in models, as well as the results of including them. The following
description of such variables is separated into two sections: one about variables used as
determinants of demand, and one about those used as determinants of supply. In addition, these
sections, also give attention to whether or not variables have been used for a single housing
market model or one that separates owner- from renter-occupied housing.
2.3.1 Variables Used as Determinants of Demand
Economists have used many variables to explain changes in price, including housing stock,
ownership cost rates, lagged prices, and exogenous demographic and economic variables.
Before discussing the theory behind and results of using these independent variables, it is
important to understand how theorists have measured demand, the dependent variable.
2.3.1.1 Price and Rent - the Dependent Variables
Demand has been measured in several ways. First, Mankiw, a Market Equilibrium theorist,
measures demand in terms of the value of the housing demanded:
The [dependent variable, demand] is the value of the property for the unit in
which the household resides. For owner occupied units this is reported directly.
In the case of rental units, we used the approximation that the value is equal to
100 times the gross monthly rent. [15]
Kearl similarly argues that, in a world characterized by efficient markets, price (which he calls
'asset price') is simply capitalized rent ('service price'). His primary demand model makes no
attempt to distinguish between ownership and rental housing, using only relative price as a proxy
for housing demand.
Poterba takes a similar approach. In his article Tax Subsidies to Owner-Occupied Housing: An
Asset-Market Approach [18], Poterba states that "A rational homebuyer should equate the price
of a house with the present discounted value of its future service stream.." Because of this
capitalized approach he too makes no attempt to distinguish between rent and price as proxies for
demand, instead using only a data series composed of the values of residential structures. 2
In their two articles, Wheaton and DiPasquale expand on this theory. They estimate two models
that recognize differences between the demand for rental and owner units: one uses price as a
proxy for demand for ownership housing, the other uses rent to model demand for rental
housing. They argue that rent and house price together are a measure of the overall demand for
housing [6, 7].
2.3.1.2 Housing Stock
The Market Equilibrium Theorists described in the first section of this chapter determine demand
with exogenous economic and demographic variables instead of the simultaneous supply they
argue is the true determinant of demand. For this reason, their models exclude supply variables.
However, this is not the case for the Stock Flow theorists, who include a measure of lagged
supply.
Kearl [13] argues that housing stock (and the housing services it supplies) is an important
determinant of the price of housing relative to other goods. He hypothesizes that while "one
might expect demographic pressures to determine the number of units in the stock over long
periods," it is the size of the stock, along with income, "a vector of household characteristics,"
and the cost of housing capital that determine the relative price of housing. He also states that
"[s]ince over long periods of time the stock cannot be assumed to be fixed, [the asset price of
housing] will be affected by construction activity." In his demand equation, Kearl divides total
stock by number of households in order to derive the nation's annual number of units per
household. Coefficients on this variable are of the expected sign and statistically significant at a
5% significance level.
Poterba also asserts that supply is an important predictor of demand: "a given initial stock of
house and real house price...[will help] determine the expected real capital gain needed to induce
individuals to hold the entire housing stock" [18]. Because Poterba's models attempt only to
2 While Poterba constructs clear economic theories of both supply and demand, he constructs an
econometric model only for supply.
predict housing investment, a measure of supply, it is impossible to determine the reliability of
his hypothesis about the relationship between supply and capital gains.
Finally, Wheaton and DiPasquale also include current stock as a determinant of prices [7]. Their
owner housing demand model, like Kearl's, uses the current number of units per household,
while their rental housing demand model uses simply the current stock. In both models,
coefficients have expected signs and are significant at a 5% significance level.
2.3.1.3 Inflation, Expected Appreciation and Interest Rates
While both Market Equilibrium and Stock-Flow Theorists believe that interest rates are
important determinants of demand, their exact effect and form has been long-debated. Kearl
argues that the expectation of inflation causes rates on conventional fixed payment, long-term
home mortgages to rise. This rise in rates, because of the structure of conventional mortgages,
typically leads to a mortgage payment inflation rate that is much higher than that of the
consumer price index. Higher fixed mortgage payments over the long 30 year term, he argues,
make housing much more costly relative to other goods, resulting in decreased demand. As a
result of this hypothesis, Kearl includes a mortgage payment variable in his models, the
coefficient of which is significant and negative [13].
In the same article, Kearl theorizes that the cost of housing capital, which includes real interest
rates, expected appreciation, and depreciation, is a determinant of demand. He argues that while
increases in real interest and depreciation rates make housing more expensive, this negative
pressure on demand is mitigated by expectations that the value of the purchased housing will rise
in relation to other goods. As a result he subtracts an expected housing appreciation rate from
real interest and depreciation rates. Finally, he adjusts this housing capital cost rate by tax
consequences such as the deductibility of depreciation and interest from income. While Kearl
believes that the effects of rising inflation rates on ownership costs are somewhat offset by
expected appreciation and tax laws, he does not theorize that these latter effects ever more-than-
compensate for rising nominal interest rates.
Hendershott and Shilling revised Kearl's theories about the connection between inflation and
appreciation one year after the publication of his article:
The true real cost of homeownership fell sharply between the middle 1960s and
1970s [a period of high inflation] because the real after-tax financing rate
declined. That is, the mortgage rate, after allowing for its deduction in
computing one's taxable income, has risen by less than the expected rate of
appreciation in the purchased house. [12]
These authors also expand Kearl's consideration of the ownership market to the renter market as
well. They conclude that the lowering of owner costs of capital due to tax treatment and
expected gains is not also true in the renter market:
While the real after-tax financing rate for rental housing has declined by even
more because landlords tend to be in higher tax brackets than homeowners, the
taxation of rental housing is less favorable than that of owner-occupied housing
in inflationary periods. More specifically, nominal capital gains are taxed at the
point of sale at both the capital gains and minimum (after 1969) tax rates, and
tax depreciation is based on historic, rather than replacement, cost. [12]
The next year, 1984, Poterba came to similar conclusions about the owner market:
Rising inflation rates push up nominal interest rates, increasing the homeowner's
interest charges, and lead to large nominal capital gains on houses...Because of
the tax system, however, an increase in the inflation rate reduces the real cost of
homeownership. Homeowners are permitted to deduct mortgage interest
payments from their taxable income...[and] a variety of provisions...make capital
gains essentially untaxed. Owner occupants therefore gain on balance. [18]
Like Hendershott and Shilling, Poterba argues that the negative effects of inflation are more-
than-offset not only by capital gains, but also by the tax-deductibility of those gains. But unlike
Hendershott and Shilling, Poterba fails to test his model in the rental market.
Hamilton and Schwab also theorize about the effect of interest rates on demand for ownership
housing [9]. They argue that the effects of higher interest rates on mortgage payments are offset
by expectations of future capital gains. In their model, the rate at which rents are capitalized into
prices is determined by the sum of the asset depreciation and prevailing interest rate minus a rate
of expected future appreciation. Their findings suggest that, while expected appreciation may
remain an important determinant of price, households frequently ignore or misinterpret market
information when making price predictions.
Finally, Wheaton and DiPasquale incorporate these cost of capital theories into their demand
models [7]. In estimating price, they demonstrate the effect on the model's predictability of
different types of price expectations and subsequent adjustments to the ownership cost of capital.
Like Hendershott and Shilling, they hypothesize that ownership costs play an important role in
determining demand for rental housing, and thus include them in their estimation of rent
changes.
2.3.1.4 Lagged Price and Rent
Traditional Stock-Flow theory asserts that while supply is best estimated with a measure of
lagged demand, the flexible nature of prices makes demand determined only by current measures
of supply and other independent variables. This theory, however, has recently been questioned.
Unlike Kearl and Poterba, who assert that short run prices and rents are determined almost
instantaneously by a fixed short-run supply of housing, Wheaton and DiPasquale argue that
prices and rents actually adjust gradually to a slowly changing supply:
There is compelling evidence that [in addition to the supply side of the market]
the demand side of the market also does not clear quickly. The fact that housing
prices are incomplete predictors of new construction, the observation that
vacancy rates generate gradual price changes, and the observed tendency for
positive serial correlation in housing prices all can be explained if prices adjust
only gradually over a number of periods in response to shocks. [7]
The authors explain that this phenomenon is caused primarily by the fact that long sales time (an
outcome of product heterogeneity and time-consuming searches) may deter sellers from rapidly
changing their offered prices. Wheaton and DiPasquale thus innovate demand determination by
including lagged price as an independent variable, which consistently generates a highly
significant positive coefficient.
Wheaton and DiPasquale similarly assert that rents adjust only gradually [6]. In the case of
rental housing, they theorize that rents fail to adjust quickly to vacancy changes because of high
transaction costs and the widespread existence of rental contracts. Like the lagged price
variable, the lagged rent variable they subsequently include in the rental demand equation
generates a statistically significant coefficient of the expected sign. Though their writings state
that ownership and rent markets are part of a dynamic system, with households moving into and
out of the rental market depending on the relative cost of ownership housing, they do not include
the lagged relative price of ownership housing in their estimation of rental demand, instead using
the ownership cost of capital as a method for incorporating ownership demand into the
estimation of rental demand.
2.3.1.5 Exogenous Demographic Variables
Both Market Equilibrium and Stock-Flow Theorists estimate demand using demographic
variables. As was described in the first section of this chapter, Mankiw, a member of the Market
Equilibrium school, attempts to model demand using only the variation in the population's age
distribution over time [15]. Use of this demographic variable to predict changes in price results
in poor goodness of fit statistics, though the sign of the coefficient of age distribution is
significant and of the expected sign.
Kearl, a Stock-Flow theorist, argues that demographic variables play a critical role in
determining demand for ownership housing:
Household characteristics may play a very important role in the analysis [of
demand]...Variables such as current income, family size, and the demographic
characteristics of the population have clear interpretations, but since the housing
decision has long-run implications a more or less explicit lifetime plan lies
behind the demand schedule. Hence, the age of the household and the measure
of expected or permanent income that might perhaps be based on education,
skills, occupation, etc., should be included. Furthermore..., since these services
are also acquired by owning the asset, the variance of income and the illiquid
nature of the asset may affect the demand on the part of certain individuals. [13]
Kearl therefore uses measures of the number of households and permanent income in his demand
model estimation. The coefficient of number of households, which is divided by total stock to
obtain a measure of housing units per household, is significant and of the expected sign. The
coefficient of permanent income, while of the expected sign, is found to be significant at only a
10% level of significance.
Though Poterba chooses not to estimate an actual demand model, he articulates two possible
hypotheses about determinants of changes in housing demand, neither of which includes
demographic variables [18]. Instead, he argues that economic factors3 are more important
determinants of demand.
Wheaton and DiPasquale include various demographic variables in their estimation of both
ownership and rental demand [6,7]. Of ownership demand determination, they state it is possible
to represent
the fractions of households that desire single family units [with the variables
of]...total households,...the rent index,...the age-expected homeownership
rate,.. .the permanent income per household,...the price index of housing,...and
the annual user cost of homeownership. [7]
As a result, their regression equation for ownership demand (which uses price as a dependent
variable) includes measures of the number of households, homeownership rates, and permanent
income. Coefficients of these variables are of the expected sign, but significance levels are not
always less than 5%.
Wheaton and DiPasquale's rent equations similarly use measures of several demographic
variables, including the number of employees per household and income per household [6].
While the coefficient of income is significant, it is impossible to determine if it is of the correct
sign because of conflicting theory on the impact of income on rents.
2.3.1.6 Exogenous Economic Variables
Poterba articulates two hypotheses about possible determinants of change in housing demand (as
measured by change in real house price appreciation), both of which rely almost exclusively on
exogenous economic variables [18]. His first hypothesis about house price change is that a given
"real capital gain [is] needed to entice individuals to hold the entire housing stock." This gain,
he argues, is determined by such economic and financial variables as the depreciation rate of
housing, maintenance and repair costs, interest rates, the owner's income tax rate, the property
tax rate, and expected capital gains from holding the property. His second hypothesis is that
"[a]sset-market equilibrium may also be explained by arguing that the price of a house must
equal the present discounted value of its net future service flow." He theorizes that this present
value is determined by most of the same exogenous variables included in his first hypothesis, the
3 Which are discussed in the following subsection.
net value of which must be "discounted at the homeowner's real after-tax interest rate." Poterba
does not offer hypotheses about the economic variables that may play a role in determining the
change in demand for rental housing.
Before including the previously described demographic variables in their model of rental
housing demand changes, Wheaton and DiPasquale first test the notion that "...in principle,
equilibrium apartment rents should be neutral with respect to overall inflation, and vacancy
would influence the movement only of real rents" [6]. They go on to estimate two models, one
including only the exogenous economic variables of lagged vacancy rate and the other including
vacancy as well as the economy-wide inflation rate. The first equation yields a statistically
insignificant coefficient on lagged vacancy and a very low R square, while the second yields
statistically significant coefficients of the expected sign, but only slightly improved goodness-of-
fit. These results suggest that vacancy alone is insufficient to explain changes in demand.
Instead other demographic variables, such as interest rates, are needed to accurately predict
changes in supply.
2.3.2 Variables Used as Determinants of Housing Supply
Economists have also used a range of factors to explain changes in supply, including endogenous
demand variables (typically price and rent) and exogenous economic variables. Before
discussing the results of using these independent variables, it is important to understand how
theorists have measured supply, the dependent variable.
2.3.2.1 Housing Stock and Construction - The Dependent Variables
Supply has traditionally been measured in terms of overall stock, with changes in stock
symbolized by the number of building permits issued or the number of units constructed/
completed within a given area. Mankiw attempts to estimate the supply of the overall housing
market in this way:
We begin by looking at whether there is any correlation between our housing
demand variables and the quantity of housing. We measure the quantity of
housing as the net stock of residential capital. [15]
This is also the case with Kearl (who, because of his belief that supply is fixed by demographic
variables, makes no attempt to predict changes in it) [13], as well as with Wheaton and
DiPasquale [6,7]. Kearl also makes the important point that the number of units may not be an
altogether accurate measure of supply:
[I]f initial [mortgage] payments did matter and demand was depressed, one
would expect that following the relative price adjustment there would be the
construction of a number of units consistent with demographic pressures but of a
lower quality...[13]
He argues that supply should therefore also include some measure of quality, not just quantity.
Finally, Poterba differs from Kearl and from Wheaton and DiPasquale by measuring changes in
supply in terms of "gross residential investment," a financial instead of physical measure [18].
He defines this dependent variable as the value of the output of the construction industry within a
given period of time. Measuring changes in supply in this way means that Poterba's measure of
overall supply consists of the total value of residential structures in a given area, excluding land.
2.3.2.2 Construction Flows and Prices or Rent
The most important, and contentious independent variables examined in the determination of
supply are price and rent. Market Equilibrium theorists hypothesize that supply (and thus
changes in it) adjusts quickly to changes in demand [6,12]. Though they prefer to model changes
in current supply exclusively with changes in current demand (which might be symbolized by
prices or rent), simultaneity prevents such an estimation. They therefore instead model changes
in supply with exogenous economic and demographic variables in a reduced form equation.
Stock-Flow theorists assume that price and rent are accurate predictors of supply if the models
into which they are incorporated somehow correct for large delays caused by the construction
process. Wheaton and DiPasquale and Poterba, for example, all include current measures of
price and/or rent in the models they estimate [6,7,18]. Poterba, in measuring monetary
investment in housing, uses a house price index, which has significant coefficients (at a 5%
significance level) with the expected sign on several models. Similarly, Wheaton and
DiPasquale estimate statistically significant coefficients for prices and rent in estimating models
of ownership and rental housing, respectively. These current measures of price and rent are
acceptable because they are used to measure changes in construction or permits, which are
themselves lagged in the calculation of current stock.
If housing supply is not simply determined demographically and is instead similar to other
commodities, in an economically efficient world changes in supply should be caused only by
changes in rent and price (demand). However, Wheaton and DiPasquale explain that many other
variables actually help explain changes in construction:
[Many] have ...produced evidence that prices or rents move only gradually, and
that vacancy rates operate like a Walrasian adjustment mechanism. On the
supply side of the market, estimated models of new housing construction
invariably contain a range of variables in addition to house prices and
construction costs. Vacancy rates, mortgage rates, sales rates, and general
macroeconomic conditions all seem to add significantly to equations forecasting
building activity. If the market were clearing rapidly and in equilibrium, such
factors would be fully incorporated into house prices which then would be the
sole determinant of new supply. [6]
It is the slow adjustment of supply to demand that helps explain why other independent variables
are considered in models of construction activity. These additional variables are discussed in the
following subsection.
2.3.2.3 Exogenous Economic Determinants of Supply
Despite the evolution of logical economic theory about the determinants of changes in housing
supply, estimating a theoretically sound model resulting in strong goodness-of-fit and
significance statistics has been difficult. This has resulted in the use of a wide range of
exogenous economic variables, some seemingly obscure.
In his estimation of the amount of investment in housing, Poterba uses a number of such
variables [18]. First, as one proxy for opportunity cost to builders, he includes a price index for
alternative outputs deflated by the consumer price index. The coefficient of this variable is
consistently significant and negative throughout. Poterba also includes, somewhat surprisingly,
a correction of the house price series for the average time that houses remain on the market prior
to being sold. This, he argues, is important because it takes into account the high cost of interest
in holding an unsold, and presumably unused home.
Poterba argues that changes in supply are explained by two additional exogenous variables.
First, he uses prevailing (apparently nominal) construction industry costs. The coefficient of this
variable is not always negative and is never significant at a 5% level of significance. Finally, he
asserts that, because construction requires finance, a measure of "credit rationing" should be
included. The coefficient of this variable is consistently significant and of the expected sign.
Finally, Wheaton and DiPasquale include different exogenous variables in their models of
changes in ownership and rental supply [6,7]. In ownership models, "The cost shifters
included ...are the real cost of short term construction financing and cost indices for construction
and land." Wheaton and DiPasquale describe their model of rental supply in the following way:
The level of new housing construction depends on how asset or market price of
rental housing compares with construction costs ...The asset price of rental
housing should be based on current rental income (involving both rent and
vacancy), together with a capitalization rate.. .[W]e offer a detailed but fairly
standard determination of a capitalization rate for rental structures which
converts current rental income into an asset price. This "rental cost of capital"
considers the various provisions of the US tax code together with anticipated
growth in rental income....In addition..., we also include a lagged level of
construction to allow for the possibility that new supply does not respond
immediately to changes in market conditions. Finally, over most of the last 30
years, the Federal government has produced a considerable flow of subsidized
units..., [which] should be included in a construction equation. [6]
Wheaton and DiPasquale thus include exogenous measures of interest rates, construction costs,
and completions of federally owned units in addition to previously discussed measures of rent
and lagged completions. Coefficients of these exogenous variables are all of the expected sign,
but the coefficient of federal completions is not statistically significant.
2.4 Limitations qf Previous Models
Review of economic theory and the components of previously models used to test theory reveal a
three types of historic problems: failure to specify the true interaction between owner and renter
markets, failure to specify gradual adjustments of demand and supply, and failure to apply
models locally.
2.4.1 Specification of the Interaction Between Owner and Renter Markets
Many economists have ignored any interaction between owner- and renter-occupied housing
markets. These authors instead theorize that housing prices and rents are essentially equivalent,
being separated only by a consistent capitalization rate. Wheaton and DiPasquale and
Hendershott and Shilling are notable exceptions to this rule. However, Wheaton and DiPasquale
limit the interaction of the rental and ownership markets to the specification of the ownership
cost of capital as a determinant of renter demand:
On the one hand, since inflation, interest rates, and tax policy determine the
"cost of homeownership," they affect the demand for rental housing. When
homeownership is inexpensive, as was the case in the mid and late 1970s, then
presumably the demand for rental housing declines. [6]
As a result, they specify an ownership cost of capital variable (which includes the expected
appreciation of houses) in their rental housing demand function. Hendershott and Shilling make
a similar assumption in calculating a homeownership rate: "The adjusted homeownership rate
should depend largely on the attractiveness of homeownership relative to renting." (p.120)
Despite this acknowledgment of the interplay between markets, none attempts to measure the
impact of real house price itself on the demand for rental housing. Instead economists have
represented ownership demand in rent equations only through ownership costs, which dilute the
effect of price by including both interest rates and price changes in a single variable. The model
constructed in this paper tests the hypothesis that lagged prices by themselves as well as within
owner costs serves as a better model of the interaction of prices on rents.
2.4.2 Gradual Adjustment of Supply and Demand
Many previous authors also ignore gradual adjustment of supply and demand to market changes.
The highly significant signs of coefficients for lagged price, rent, and stock in Wheaton and
DiPasquale's demand and supply models suggests that these variables are powerful in explaining
changes [6,7]. This supports the theory that peculiarities of construction as well as price and rent
setting make the housing market unlike other factor markets, and that its unique gradual
adjustment must be modeled. This paper's models therefore incorporate such gradual changes.
2.4.3 Applicability to Multiple Local Markets
Finally, previous models of housing supply, demand, ownership costs, and ownership rates have
typically studied the nation's real estate as a whole [1,2,6,7,10,12,13,15,19]. So far, little has
been done to test the applicability of any given model to multiple metropolitan areas. The model
constructed in this paper is applied to four different cities: Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Houston.
The good fit of a single model to all four areas would suggest that the nation's myriad local real
estate markets operate with similar economic systems. Mixed results (that is, a good fit of the
model to some markets and not to others) would suggest that the nation's local markets are
segmented and that local supply and demand may be more accurately determined by city-specific
economic forces and variables. Finally, poor fit to all cities would call into question the model's
ability to accurately explain the forces behind any market's housing supply and demand or
indicates a lack of reliable metropolitan level data.
2.5 Proposed Model
The models proposed in this paper are based upon adaptations to those constructed by Wheaton
and DiPasquale [6,7]. They both incorporate the gradual adjustment of housing supply and
demand and estimate such supply and demand separately for owner- and renter-occupied
housing. The following sections first discuss the general relationships that underlie Wheaton and
DiPasquale's theory and then describe the specification of owner- and renter- occupied housing
supply and demand models.
2.5.1 General Relationships
Wheaton and DiPasquale's models of the housing market are based upon improvements of
traditional theories about the market's operation:
The traditional assumption in the stock-flow model is that markets clear quickly
and, at any time, prices adjust to equate the demand for housing with existing
stock. Thus, equilibrium price levels are determined in each period as a function
of the housing stock, demand instruments, and mortgage interest rates: [7]
D(X1, P, U, R)= S (1)
Where D is the demand for housing, S is the supply of housing, X1 represents a vector of
exogenous variables, P is the real price level of housing, U is the annual user cost of financing
that price, and R is the alternative cost of renting (This relationship is similar to that described in
Figure 1, Chapter 2). In addition, U is further specified by the following equation:
U = (i + tp)(1-ty) - E(AP/P) (2)
In this relationship, user costs are positively affected by interest rates and property tax rates.
These costs, however, must be corrected for the deductibility of interest and property taxes from
taxable income and for expected price appreciation, represented by 1-ty and E(AP/P),
respectively.
Wheaton and DiPasquale also specify a general relationship determining changes in supply:
AS = C(X2, P) - 8S (3)
In this relationship, the change in supply is determined by construction, C, which is in turn
dependent on another set of exogenous variables X2, and general housing prices (in the
ownership market). This construction amount is offset each year by 6S, the scrappage rate of
housing.
Wheaton and DiPasquale argue that the general relationships above ignore many important
aspects of housing markets. Most importantly, they assert that housing supply and demand must
be estimated separately for ownership and rental housing.
2.5.2 Demand for Owner-Occupied Housing
Wheaton and DiPasquale first revise relationship (1) with the following relationship:
Ht(I 1Rt + p2OWNt + p3WAGEt + p4Pt + psUt) = St (4)
This is similar to equation (1) but in this case supply, St is not that of all housing but just that of
owner-occupied housing4 . Demand must therefore also be altered to represent only that for
owner-occupied housing. In (4), the term in parentheses may be thought of as that proportion of
households (Ht) wishing to own. This proportion, as hypothesized by equation (1) is determined
by the current relative cost of renting (Rt), demographic variables (in this case the current age
expected homeownership rate (OWNt) and the current permanent income per worker (WAGEt)),
the current price index for single family housing (Pt), and the homeownership cost of capital
(Ut). (4) is then rearranged to solve for the market-clearing price of housing, Pt*:
Pt* = (1 / 4 )[St/Ht - PIRt - 02OWNt - P3WAGEt - sUt] (5)
However, Wheaton and DiPasquale argue that equation (5) ignores gradual price adjustments.
As was explained in the first section of this chapter, Stock-Flow theorists assert that, because
supply and demand are slow to reach equilibrium, Pt* is not actually the observed market price at
time t. Instead, the current market price, Pt, is a function (t) of the current equilibrium price and
the price from last period:
Pt = TPt* + (1-)Pt-1  (6)
4 Owner-occupied housing and single-family housing are equivalent in this paper. This assumption is
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.
Equation (5) is therefore rewritten using equation (6):
Pt = (l/ 4 )[St/Ht - P1Rt - f 2OWNt - p3W AGEt - s Ut] + P6Pt- (7)
This relationship corrects the general relationships (equation (1)) for gradual price adjustment.
The term in brackets is the same as represented in equation (5), but lagged price is included as a
determinant for current ownership demand (Pt).
Wheaton and DiPasquale next adapt the interaction between demand for owner- and renter-
occupied housing specified in (7). As was described in the previous section, the authors found in
their 1990 and 1992 articles that while there is a statistically significant impact of prices on rents,
the opposite is not the case [7]. This supports the hypothesis that households prefer to own, and
rent only when ownership is too costly. Thus, while prices may be an important determinant of
rent, the inverse is not true. The interaction of the rental market with the ownership market in
(7) is therefore eliminated:
Pt = (1/3 4)[St/Ht - P,1OWNt - 02WAGEt - 3UJ]+ O5Pt_ (8)
While equation (8) is assumed to accurately represent demand for ownership housing, several
practical limitations prevent its use in this study. First, and most important, annual data on
numbers of households in each metropolitan statistical area are unavailable. A series on annual
employment (E) was therefore substituted for households, which meant eliminating the variable
measuring age-expected homeownership and altering that used to symbolize stock. In addition,
to better represent the array of demographic variables (XI in (1)), an additional variable, SIZE
was included. SIZE is defined as the population per employee (i.e. Population/E) in each period.
Because it represents the density of wage-earners within the population as a whole, it is expected
to capture the relationship to prices that the unemployment or poverty rate would have. These
changes result in a new determination of ownership demand:
Pt = (l/P 4)[St/Et - P2WAGEt - 03SIZEt - PsUt] + pWPt- (9)
In this equation, all demographic variables are based on measures of employees, not households
which, as is discussed in later sections, generates important estimation problems.
Wheaton and DiPasquale also alter the measures of Ut specified in (3). In this case, because
property tax rates (tp) and income tax rates (ty) have not differed substantially over the last thirty
years, they were eliminated:
U1t = i - (Pt-I - Pt-2 )/Pt-2  (10)
This model suggests that the nominal cost of mortgage interest rates to owners (i) is reduced by
the rate at which homeowners expect their houses to appreciate ((Pt-I - Pt-2)/Pt-2.). In this case,
buyers are assumed to have backward looking expectations. That is, they base their expectations
of future expectations on the price increases they have seen in the recent past. Several other
possible corrections of interest cost for expected appreciation are also tested:
U2t = i- (Pt-1 - Pt-3 )/Pt-3  (11)
U3t = i - (CPIt-1 - CPIt-2)/CPIt-2  (12)
U4t = i - (CPIt-1 - CPIt-3)/CPIt-3  (13)
The first of these three relationships assumes that buyers use a longer historic appreciation
period than in (1) in forming their expectations about future appreciation. The final two are
analogous to (10) and (11), but instead use historic periods of general price appreciation (as
measured by CPI, the Consumer Price Index for all urban consumers) to measure expectations.
2.5.3 Demand for Rental Housing
Turning to rental housing, Wheaton and DiPasquale hypothesize that demand is determined with
a similar relationship to demand for ownership housing. Thus, they begin with the following
relationship:
Ht(piR, + p2 OWN + p3WAGEt + p4Pt + p5U) = St (14)
In this case, St represents the supply of rental housing5 , and the expression in parentheses
represents that proportion of all households wishing to rent.6 Using the same transformation as
in equations (5) through (7), the effects of gradual rent adjustment are then included in the
model:
5 This paper assumes that rental housing and multi-family housing are equivalent. This assumption is
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.
6 It is an identity that the proportion of households wishing to rent and the proportion of households
wishing to own must equal 1.
Rt = (1/04)[St/Ht - PI Pt - f02OWNt - P3WAGEt - OsUt] + p6Rt_1 (15)
In addition, the same adaptations as were made to the ownership model must be made here in
order to include a more complete array of demographic variables and to account for the lack of
available household information:
Rt = (1/P 4 )[St/Et - fIPt - 03WAGEt - MsSIZE - p6Ut] + 37Rt-1  (16)
Unlike the determination of demand for ownership housing, this relationship includes Wheaton
and DiPasquale's interaction of ownership and rental markets. This interaction is specified by
both house price (P) and homeownership user costs (Ut). These variables are expected to have a
positive relationship with rent because if either rises, households will be forced from the owner-
to the renter-occupied market, raising rents.
2.5.4 Supply of Ownership Housing
Wheaton and DiPasquale define the general adjustment mechanism for supply in (3) above. As
in the determination of demand for housing, this relationship must be adapted to conform to the
realities of the separate owner and rental sides of the market. In this paper, additions to supply
(C in (3)) are separated into additions to owner and rental supply. These additions are in turn
measured by the issuance of single- and multi-family housing permits (SFP and MFP,
respectively).
Changes in the supply of owner housing, as measured by single family building permits (SFP)
are determined by the following equation:
SFPt = a +a1Pt - a 2Pt-I - a3TBILLt - a 4SFt-1  (17)
This relationship is similar to that proposed by Wheaton and DiPasquale. It assumes that
additions to the supply of ownership housing are directly affected by changes in demand for
ownership housing (P) and inversely impacted by changes in the short term borrowing rate
(TBILLt, which is the current yield on three month treasury bills) and historic construction costs,
as represented by the stock of single family housing one period ago (SFt-1). This relationship
The same definitions of Ut as in equations (10) through (13) were used in determination of rental
demand.
also assumes that construction lags prevent supply from adjusting instantaneously to demand.
For this reason, the current period's adjustment is dependent on the prices one period ago (Pt- 1).
Inclusion of both current and lagged price better explains the effect on single-family construction
of both short- and long-term changes in price. The short term effect is defined as -a2(Pt-Pt-i)
while the long term effect is determined by (al+ax2 )Pt.
Finally, gradual adjustment of supply is represented by a lagged version of permits, suggesting
that permits in previous periods are by themselves a partial predictor of permit issuance in the
current period. This results in the following adaptation to (17):
SFPt = a +a1 Pt - a 2Pt-1 - a3TBILLt - a 4SFt-1 + a5 SFPt.1  (18)
2.5.5 Supply of Multi-Family Housing
Adjustment to supply of rental housing, which is measured in terms of issuance of multi-family
permits (MFP), may similarly be estimated with the following equation:
MFPt = a +aIRt - a2Rt-i - a3TBILLt - a 4MFt-1 + a5HUDt + a6MFPt-1  (19)
This equation also assumes that today's multi-family permits are directly affected by demand for
rental housing (R), and inversely related to the short term cost of borrowing (TBILL) as well as
historic costs in the form of the multi-family stock of one period ago (MFt-1). The gradual
adjustment of supply is represented through the inclusion of lagged demand (Rt. 1) as well as the
lagged dependent variable. Inclusion of both current and lagged rent better explains the effect on
multi-family construction of both short- and long-term changes in rent. The short-term effect is
defined as -a 2(Rt-Rt-1) while the short-term effect is determined by (ai+a 2)Rt.
Finally, because of the federal government's long-time involvement in the production of public
rental housing, the annual approvals of such units must also be included as an independent
variable (HUDt). However, this is a national series, and may not explain city-specific changes in
public unit authorizations. Because the measure of multi-family permit issuance used in this
paper includes permits issued for the production of public housing, HUD is expected to have a
positive relationship with MFPt.
2.5.6 Summary of Proposed Models
In summary, demand and supply for owner- and renter-occupied housing are specified by
the following equations:
DOwner-Occupied Housing Pt = (1 4)[St/Et - [32WAGEt - 3SIZEt - pIst] + pWPt-] (9)
DRenter-Occupied Housing = Rt = (1/3 4 )[St/Et - fiPt - P3WAGEt - SIZE - p3U 5] + $37Rt-i (16)
SOwner-Occupied Housing SFPt = a +aYIPt - ca2Pt-i - a 3TBILLt - C4SFt-i + C5SFPt-i (18)
SRenter-Occupied Housing = MFPt = c +ciRt - ax2Rt-i - a3TBILLt - a4MFt- + c 5HUDt + C6MFPt-i (19)
In addition, in (9) and (16) four different definitions of Ut are tested:
UlIt = i - (Pt-i - Pt-2)/Pt-2  (10)
U2t = i- (Pt-i - Pt-3)/Pt-3  (11)
U3t = i - (CPIt-I - CPIt-2)/CPIt-2  (12)
U4t = i - (CPIt-I - CPIt-3)/CPIt-3  (13)
These models are expected to accurately predict the behavior of housing markets in localities
throughout the US. The following chapter on data and methodology describes how Ordinary
Leas Squares Regression and data from four different metropolitan statistical areas are used to
test this hypothesis.
3. Methodology and Data
3.1 Chapter Introduction
This chapter first describes the methodology used to test the models of housing supply and
demand constructed in Chapter 2. This involves a brief description of the Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) regression method and its three primary weaknesses in relation to time series
models. In addition to OLS, testing the models constructed in Chapter 2 involved regressing
data from four metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs). The criteria used in selecting these areas -
including economic diversity, geographic distinctiveness, and interesting historic price and rent
movement - are therefore next discussed.
The chapter then moves to issues surrounding data, including a discussion of potential sources of
data as well as the shortcomings associated with each source. Finally, trends in the collected
data are analyzed in two different ways. First, trends in data on the dependent variables for each
of the four selected MSAs are compared (e.g. historic movements of house prices in Atlanta,
Boston, Detroit, and Houston are compared). This leads to the conclusion that these trends differ
from city to city. The models constructed in Chapter 2 are based on the hypothesis that changes
in prices, rents, and permit issuance are caused by changes in various independent variables. It is
therefore possible that trends in dependent variables differ from city to city because trends in
their determinants differ as well. To conduct an initial test of this theory, the trends of dependent
variables are compared to the trends of several of their determinants (e.g. movements in price are
compared to movements in employment in each of the four MSAs). This leads to the conclusion
that dependent and independent variables do not always exhibit expected relationships and that,
like trends in the dependent variables, relationships differ from MSA to MSA.
3.2 Methodology
The relationships proposed in Chapter 2 are tested with OLS Regression. In order to
demonstrate the theorized operation of housing markets across Metropolitan Statistical Areas
(MSAs), data for the included variables were collected for each of four cities: Atlanta, Boston,
Detroit, and Houston. Regressions were then conducted on the four portions of each of these
cities' housing markets: ownership and rental demand, and ownership and rental supply.
(Equations 3, 8, 9, and 10 in Chapter Two above). Once the four regression equations were
estimated, goodness-of-fit statistics, variable coefficients, and various elasticities from the four
cities were compared in order to determine the model's applicability to diverse local housing
markets. These results are presented and analyzed in Chapters 4 and 5.
3.2.1 Use of the OLS Methodology with Time Series Data
The OLS regression technique has weaknesses related to the trends that are common in much of
the time series data used in this study [14]. First, the primary measure of a regression's
goodness-of-fit, R2, becomes less reliable in analyzing data with strong trends. This is because
use of any other trended data (including a measure of time itself), may incorrectly appear to
explain much of the change in the dependent variable. For example, housing stock in all MSAs
have clear upward sloping trends. If this data is regressed against any other strong upward
sloping trend, such as perhaps growth in world population, a high R2 will result, incorrectly
suggesting that there is a strong relationship between a city's housing stock and the world's
population. The use of economic theory to specify models thus becomes more important than
ever in preventing confusion between correlation and causality.
A second problem with using OLS regression on time series data is serial correlation - the
correlation of data with itself lagged back in time. When this is the case, a lagged version of the
dependent variable is often the best estimator of the current value of the dependent variable.
However, including this lagged variable is problematic because: "The lagged dependent variable
cannot be independent of the entire disturbance vector because the dependent variable is in part
determined by the disturbance term" [14]. This in turn violates one of regression's key
assumptions: "if regressors (independent variables) are non-stochastic, they are distributed
independently of the disturbance" [14].
A final problem related to using OLS with time series data is the loss of statistical significance
that occurs with the inclusion of an independent variable highly correlated with other
independent variables. Because many of the independent variables included in the regression
have strong upward or downward trends, such correlation is likely to be high.
These weaknesses in the OLS methodology were addressed in several ways. First, in order to
avoid confusion between correlation and causality, established economic theory was used in the
selection of independent variables. In addition, in order to resolve problems associated with
serial correlation, models were altered to ensure satisfactory Durbin Watson statistics. Finally,
problems of lower significance levels upon the inclusion of highly correlated independent
variables are largely unavoidable. If two correlated independent variables were deemed by
economic theory to be important determinants of supply or demand, they were included
regardless of resulting significance levels.
3.2.2 Selection of the Four MSAs
Three criteria were used to select the four MSAs. First, in order to demonstrate the widest
applicability of results, cities from economically distinct regions were preferred. The four
selected cities satisfy this requirement, representing Southern, Northeastern, Midwestern, and
Southwestern regions. In addition, only metropolitan areas with clear, non-overlapping
boundaries were chosen. As opposed to cities such as San Francisco and Minneapolis, the
definitions of which frequently coincide with those of adjacent metropolitan areas, the four
selected cities have no large neighbors. Finally, before cities were selected, historic rent and
price data of all areas eligible according to the first two criteria were examined. Those series
with the most distinctive historic movements were selected with the belief that these movements
would generate a more logical framework for a discussion of trend analysis and regression
results.
LL Sources of Data
Building and testing the model proposed in Chapter 2 requires collection and adjustment of data,
including indexes for housing prices and rents, interest rates, housing stock, and exogenous
variables such as employment, economic growth, and population. To the extent possible, data
were collected for the four cities at the metropolitan level. In some situations, however, this was
not possible, and a single national data series had to be applied to all four areas.
3.3.1 Housing Price Indexes (P, and P. 1)
Data on housing price, which is used in this study as a proxy of demand for ownership housing,
is available for the four MSAs from three different sources. Freddie Mac, a large securitizer and
broker of home mortgage loans, produces a series for existing houses. "The series is based on a
large sample of repeat sales and uses a match sales methodology, but goes back only to [1974]"
[7]. The Freddie Mac series is desirable, and perhaps more accurate because its repeat sales
methodology makes it quality-controlled. However, the series begins in 1974, making
collection of other older house price data necessary.
Two other house price data series begin as early as 1963. First, the US Commerce Department
produces an index that uses an hedonic approach and is therefore quality controlled [7].
However, this series is less-than-desirable because it includes only new houses and values only
the structure of the housing, not the land on which it is located. A third, non-quality-controlled,
index is produced by the Federal Home Loan Bank (FHLB) which "covers existing units." This
series has two primary weaknesses: it is based on the sale prices of only homes sold with
mortgages originated by FHLB-member banks and, unlike the Freddie Mac series, includes new
as well as existing homes. However, in their article on housing prices, Wheaton and DiPasquale
demonstrate that the FHLB and Freddie Mac indexes have remarkably similar movements from
1974 to 1990 and that both reflect price cycles expected during recessionary and boom periods
[7]. Because of their similarity, the two series were joined in 1974, allowing the Freddie Mac
repeat sales to be used from 1974 through 1994 and the FHLB series to be used from 1963
through 1973.
8 Because repeat sales indexes use prices on a fixed sample of houses, they avoid measuring price changes
that occur because of changes in the housing stock (such as increased square footage, improved air
conditioning, etc.). In addition, the Freddie Mac index subtracts the value of any renovations from prices,
further ensuring quality-control.
A final problem with using all available house price data is related to sample size. House price
series are generally created to generate national single family price indexes, and therefore collect
data at the MSA level only for the purpose of aggregating them to calculate accurate national
prices. However, while any national series may be reliable because of its large and diverse
sample, sample size at the MSA-level is often much smaller, making the resulting MSA series
much less reliable. Despite these significant problems, the lack of better substitutes necessitated
use of the Freddie Mac and FHLB data.
Once the two house price data series were selected, it was necessary to correct both for inflation
and develop a way to combine them into a consistent series. Converting the indexes from
nominal to real terms was accomplished using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban
Consumers (commonly known as the CPI-U).9 After correction for inflation, the two indexes
were combined.10 The final real index values are included in the Appendix (Chapter 7).
3.3.2 Rent Indexes (R, and R. 1)
Data on rent level, which is used as a proxy for demand for rental housing in this study, are
available at the MSA level in the form of the Residential Rent component of the CPI-U produced
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.'' This series has one primary problem related to single family
homes. The rental index, which is calculated from interviews with 57,000 households in two
year time periods, includes rent of single family units, which violates the assumption of this
paper that single family units are owned and multi-family units are rented. However, because
single family renter occupied homes are a small fraction of all rental units, the problem was not
deemed large enough to exclude the otherwise reliable BLS rent series. Real rent index values
are provided in the Appendix (Chapter 7).
9 The following equation was used in the conversion process:
Nom. Housing Price Index Value = Real Housing Price Index Value*(CPI-U/100)
This involved calculating the ratio of the Freddie Mac index value for the year 1974 to the FHLB index
value for the same year. This ratio was then multiplied by the FHLB series in years 1963 through 1973:
ScaledValue = FHLBnscaled FreddieMac1 974
FHLB unscafed,197 4
The same deflation process as used with the price indexes was used to convert the rent index from
nominal to real terms. The CPI-U used here was also centered around the years 1982-1984.
3.3.3 Interest Rates (U2 and TBILL)
Two different interest rates are required by this study. First, a measure of nominal interest rates
on 30 year conventional mortgages is used to calculate owner cost of capital in the demand
models. Second, nominal T-Bill rates are needed to simulate the costs of short term borrowing
in the construction/supply models.
Because nominal mortgage rates vary little from region to region within the US, it is necessary to
collect only information on national rate changes. The first potential source of rate information
is the Federal Housing Finance Board, which composes a monthly national average interest rate
on conventional single family mortgages. The Board also recalculates an effective index which
includes the fees charged by banks for originating the mortgages included in the sample.
However, this index is available only back as far as 1973. As a result, this study uses another
data source: nominal 30 year rates published in the Economic Report of the President.
Unfortunately, these rates do not correct for the various points and fees charged by lenders to
borrowers. The Report also publishes short term interest rates. This study uses the nominal
yield on the 30 day T-Bill (denoted TBILL).
3.3.4 Housing Stock and Permits (SF, SFP, MF, and MFP)
Estimating equations for both owner and renter supply and demand depends on obtaining annual
measures of the number of owner and renter units in each MSA. Because only a small
proportion of single family units are rented and a similarly small proportion of multi-family units
are owner-occupied, this paper uses the stock of single family units as a proxy for supply of
ownership housing and the stock of multi-family units as a proxy for supply of rental housing.
In addition, because no annual series exists for the exact quantity of each housing type in each
city, annual single- and multi-family permit issuance are used as proxies for supply changes.
A methodology similar to that used by DiPasquale and Wheaton is used to generate a housing
stock series for each of the four MSAs. This involves data from two sources. First, a total of
single- and multi-family units in each of the four MSAs is produced by the Census Bureau for
the years 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1990. The 1960 value is used to initiate the series, and the
1 A constant definition of MSA was used by collecting data for the same number of counties in each MSA
each year. This process is described for permit data in the following paragraph.
three following values are used to correct it each decade. In addition to the four decade values
produced by the Census Bureau, annual changes in the size of the single- and multi-family stock
are represented with annual tallies of building permits issued in each of the four MSAs reported
in the Commerce Department's annual C40 Building Permit Report.' 3 Final single- and multi-
family permit series are included in the Appendix (Chapter 7).
The above adjustment process assumes that the buildings approved in one year are not completed
until a year later. In order to test the accuracy of this assumption, and prepare for the possibility
that buildings are constructed within a year of being permitted, a second adjustment process is
completed. This series uses current year permits to calculate the current year's stock.
There are several difficulties in collecting and using permit data. First, permit data are
complicated by changes over time in the number of permit-issuing places included in the C40
Reports. C40 reports provide permit information at the town or city level only, which are
themselves collections of permit issuing places. In 1960 the reports aggregate numbers of
permits issued in 12,000 different geographic locations. As the number of towns in the US grew
and cities expanded, the reports collected data from a greater number of places. By 1990, 17,000
permit issuing places were included in the reports. If adjustments are not made to correct for the
proliferation of permit-issuing places, numbers of building permits issued in an MSA will appear
artificially high in relation to the same MSA in an earlier time period. Fortunately, the
Commerce Department provides a scalar that can be used to make such corrections each time the
number of permit issuing places is expanded. Use of this scalar avoids the bias generated by
increased sample size.14
13 The updating process involved adding permit issuance for the prior year to the prior year's stock level.
However, because such addition includes unused building permits and ignores scrappage of housing units,
unit totals for 1970, 1980, and 1990 are higher than those reported by the Census Bureau. The following
example of the calculation of the unit total in 1961 demonstrates how these important issues were taken
into account:
S Stock197 0 - Stock 1960Stock 1961 = Stock 1960 + (Permits 1960 ) 1960
1969 Permits
This process was repeated for each of the 30 years included in the study and for the single and multi-family
housing stock series.
14 For example, in Detroit (as in all other MSAs), the number of permitting places was increased 4 times
between 1960 and 1994. Scalars are provided in the same year that an increase takes place, which meant
The building permit data involve a second complication related to the definition of an MSA.
Like the number of permit issuing places, the number of counties included in the definition of
any given MSA is subject to change as the city's population and area expands. For example, in
1960 three counties were included in the Detroit MSA, but by 1994 11 were included. This, too,
makes the number of permits issued in an MSA in a more recent year appear artificially large in
comparison to the same MSA a decade earlier. In order to avoid bias generated by this
complication, the counties included in each of the four studied MSAs are held constant from
1963 to 1994. For example, data were collected from the same three counties in Detroit -
Macomb, Oakland, and Wayne - from 1963 to 1994, even though the C40 Report includes eight
additional counties by 1994. Counts for the eight extra counties were subtracted from the
numbers used in the series presented in this paper. Geographic areas were thus held constant
over time.
A final complication in the permit data collection process involves public housing
authorizations. Despite their economic distinctiveness, older C40 Construction Reports fail to
distinguish between public and private authorizations. For this reason, public and private
housing stock were combined in all years included in this study. Such a combined series,
however, can introduce bias into any model attempting to estimate the economic forces behind
the construction of private housing units (as measured by permits). To overcome this problem, a
'special series from the Department of Housing and Urban Development on the number of
publicly assisted units' (p.344) started during each year of the sample is used as an independent
variable in the estimation of the rental supply model. This is the same series collected and used
by DiPasquale and Wheaton and is intended to capture changes in permit issuance caused by
public sector activity.
that the following scalars were provided in Detroit: 100.4 in 1967, 103.3 in 1972, 102.0 in 1978, and 100.2
in 1984. The 1967 scalar may be interpreted to mean that the 1967 count of permits issued in Detroit is
0.4% higher than it would have been without the increase in number of permit issuing places from which
permit counts were taken. This makes possible correction for increases in permit issuing places. For
example, in order to convert the 1984 permit count to what it would have been with the number of permit
issuing places used in 1960, the following calculation was made:
1985 PermitsUnadjusted
1 9 8 Permits Adjustes 
~ 100.2 * 102.0 * 103.3 * 100.4
3.3.5 Demographic Data (E, WAGE, SIZE)
According to the traditional housing market theory, one of the primary determinants of housing
demand is the number of households in the market. However, as was discussed in Chapter 2, no
accurate annual count of households is available at the metropolitan or county level. As a result,
employment (E) is used as a proxy. Employment is assumed to be a better proxy for households
than population because, like households, changes in the variable will be affected by the
economy. Household formation is generally assumed to increase not just as the population
increases, but as incomes increase and allow for family members to move out into their own
housing units. Likewise, employment increases not just with increases in population, but with
the job formation generated by an expanding economy. However, the two variables are also
quite different. They may, for example, have differing relationships to marriage, birth rates, and
divorce. Increased marriage rates, for instance, may cause household formation to decrease (as
single adults move in together) less employment because of the growing presence of married
women in the work force. If such differences are large. estimation of demand using employment
may harm results, particularly for demographic variables. However, because no better
substitutes are available, an annual series for the number of employees in each of the four MSAs
was obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis through Regional Financial Associates
(RFA) and used to estimate demand.
Demand models tested in this paper also hypothesize the demand for both ownership and rental
housing is affected by two demographic variables: WAGE (Income/Employment) and SIZE
(Population/Employment). The annual income and population series needed to calculate these
ratios were also obtained at the MSA level from the Bureau of Economic Analysis through RFA.
3.4 Preliminary Data Analysis: Inconsistent History and Surprising Relationships
The following trend analysis first compares the historic movement of the dependent variables
(price, rent, single-family permits, and multi-family permits) in each of the MSAs. This
demonstrates that housing supply and demand have historically moved differently from city to
city. Such differences, however, may be caused by differences in movements of independent
variables in each of the cities. In order to determine if this is case, historic movement in the
dependent variables in each MSA is compared to movement in several independent variables
(e.g. changes in price in Atlanta, Boston, Detroit, and Houston are compared to changes in
WAGE in each of those cities). Results of this second part of the trend analysis suggest not only
that dependent variables often exhibit unexpected relationships with independent variables, but
that these relationships differ from city to city.
3.4.1 Historic Movements in Price
Prices at the metropolitan level have demonstrated different trends. Houston, Detroit, and
Atlanta house prices, after a cycle in the middle of the data series, are now almost unchanged
from those thirty years ago. Boston's prices, however, once adjusted for inflation, show a strong
upward trend (Figure 1).
Figure 1
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In Detroit, Houston, and to a lesser degree Atlanta, prices grew from 1963 to 1980. In Detroit
and Houston, this growth was almost 40%, while in Atlanta it was closer to 20%. However, all
three MSAs subsequently experienced strong declines. Prices in Atlanta and Houston fell back
to 1960 levels and have not yet recovered. Those in Detroit also initially lost all earlier gains,
but since increased 25%. The economic character of each MSA may explain much of the timing
in price changes. Houston, for example, shows an early- to mid-1980s peak in prices coinciding
with the peak in oil prices. Houston house prices then drop with oil prices in the late 1980s.
Flat price trends in Atlanta, Detroit, and Houston contrast sharply with Boston's. The first two
thirds of the Boston price series is characterized by constant strong appreciation, resulting in a
doubling of real prices. Instead of the cyclical depreciation characteristic in the three other
MSAs, Boston's 1983 house prices subsequently appreciate at an even faster pace, doubling
again in the five years between 1984 and 1989. This price boom then reverses to become
Boston's first modem house price cycle, resulting in 25% depreciation from 1989 to 1994.
However, 1994 prices are more than 200% of their 1963 levels.
Calculation of correlation coefficients confirms the apparent different behavior of prices in the
four MSAs. Correlation is especially poor between Boston and Houston, with a coefficient
between the two series of -0.38. Though the other cities show positive correlation, coefficients
are low, ranging from between 0.08 for Detroit and Houston to 0.40 between Atlanta and Boston.
3.4.2 Historic Movements in Rent
MSA rent data exhibit trends related to prices, with those in Atlanta, Detroit, and Houston again
moving differently than those in Boston (Figure 2). However, as correlation coefficients
suggest,
rents behave more consistently across metropolitan areas than do prices. In this case, no series
are negatively correlated, and, with the exception of a correlation coefficient between the Boston
and Houston series of 0.17, all other coefficients are above 0.50.
Figure 2
Historic Rent Movement
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Between 1963 and 1994, real rents in Atlanta, Detroit, and Houston declined. Atlanta and
Detroit experienced brief interruptions in this trend from 1983 to 1990, resulting in increases of
20%. However, these gains were erased in the early 1980s to result in 1994 rents 30-40% lower
than those in 1963. Houston's rent series shows a similar downward trend, but without an
interruption in the late 1980s. Houston's resulting 1994 rents are only 45% of 1963 levels.
Rents in Boston during this time exhibit less volatility and have 1994 levels similar to those 30
years ago. Boston's rents remained constant in the ten years from 1963 to 1973 and then fell by
20% in the ensuing ten years. After 1983, this downward trend was reversed, with rent
appreciation between ten and twenty percent. However, declines since this period have left
Boston's 1994 rents at close to 1963 levels.
These trends suggest the relative strength of Boston's rents and prices over those in Atlanta,
Detroit, and Houston. In Boston, prices demonstrate a strong upward trend while those in
Atlanta, Detroit, and Houston has been flat. While rents in Boston currently remain at 1963
levels, those of Atlanta, Detroit, and Houston are even weaker, showing downward trends over
the past thirty years. This contrast in behavior might also be caused by especially weak rents and
prices in Boston in the early part of the series, which have recently reached more normal levels.
3.4.3 Historic Movements In Multi-Family Permit Issuance
Comparisons of changes in stock, as measured by annual permit issuance, show that housing
production has no trend and differs in the four MSAs (Figure 3).
Figure 3
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All four cities have experienced two cycles in multi-family permit issuance since 1960. Atlanta,
Boston, and Detroit have similar cycles, with a tripling of building authorizations in all three
cities between 1962 and 1972. Issuance then dropped to approximately 1966 levels, remaining
stagnant until the mid-1980s, when large increases recurred. These increases then disappeared in
the early 1990s, failing to recover before the end of the data series.
Houston also experienced two multi-family permit issuance cycles, both of which are more
dramatic. Permit issuance rose there by almost double that of Boston and Detroit in the mid-
1960s. The subsequent downward cycle was then much briefer than in the other MSAs, resulting
in another peak that occurred as early as 1978, coinciding with the peak in oil prices. Houston's
multi-family permit issuance boom then ended at almost the same time that the other three
MSAs' began to rise again.
This apparently divergent behavior of the Houston series is confirmed by correlation
coefficients. The Houston series has the lowest correlations with the other cities, ranging from
0.15 with Atlanta to -0.03 with Detroit. Other MSAs, however, exhibit much greater correlation,
from 0.82 between Boston and Detroit to 0.63 between Atlanta and Detroit.
3.4.4 Historic Movements in Single-Family Permit Issuance
Single -family permit issuance has exhibited more volatility and even less similarity between
MSAs than multi-family permit issuance. Movement in Houston and Atlanta's post-1976
building authorizations has been quite volatile (Figure 4).
Figure 4
Historic Single Family Permit Issuance
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Both cities have experienced doubling or tripling of permit issuance twice since the mid-1960s.
In addition, before the 1980s, Detroit's single-family issuance experience three strong cycles, a
much higher level of volatility than in its multi-family series. Finally, with the exception of the
5000
coincidence of Houston's single-family permit issuance with late 70s and early 80s high oil
prices, movement in other cities has not followed any obvious economic trend.
3.4.5 Historic Movements in Local Demographic and Economic Data
Employment, one of the primary determinants of both ownership and rental demand, also shows
dissimilar behavior in the four MSAs. While all four cities show cyclicality in employment
changes, presumably because of national recessions and recoveries, these cycles coincide only
intermittently (Figure 5).
Figure 5
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From 1963 through 1973, the four MSAs have differing employment behavior. However, local
economies then coincide from 1973 through 1980, together experiencing an employment boom,
a recession, and a second boom. From 1980 through 1984, the four MSAs again move
differently, until they all enter the national employment boom of the mid to late 1980s. All four
economies then enter a recession and subsequent slight recovery together in the early 1990s.
The divergence in the employment series made apparent in Figure 5 is also confirmed by
correlation coefficients which vary widely from as low as 0.20 between Detroit and Houston to
0.64 between Atlanta and Boston.
3.4.6 Relationships Between Dependent and Independent Variables
The analysis conducted in the preceding section makes clear that dependent variables (price,
rent, multi-family permits, and single-family permits) behave differently from MSA to MSA.
However, this does not mean that a single economic model cannot explain housing market
changes at the metropolitan level. Instead, the economic model proposed in this paper uses
changes in independent variables to explain changes in dependent variables. Changes in the
dependent variable may therefore differ in the four MSAs as long as the dependent variables
consistently exhibit expected relationships with independent variables (e.g. price and
employment should be positively correlated in all four MSAs).
The following section continues the above trend analysis by comparing movements in dependent
variables to those of independent variables. The analysis is divided into two sections. The first
analyzes the relationship between the dependent variables representing supply (multi-family and
single-family permits) and two independent variables (rent and price) in all four metropolitan
areas. The second section examines the relationship between the dependent variables
representing demand (rent and price) and two independent variables (price and employment) in
all four metropolitan areas. This analysis results in the conclusion that dependent variables have
relationships with independent variables that differ from MSA to MSA.
3.4.6.1 Supply
Both owner and renter supply should have a positive relationship with price and rent. That is,
price and rent increases are theorized to stimulate production of units. A comparison of trends in
single family production with prices and multi-family production with rents demonstrates that
this relationship is not always clear.
In order to determine the degree to which demand stimulates supply in the single family market,
flows are compared. Changes in demand are measured in terms of annual changes in house
prices or rents, while supply changes are measured in terms of the number of permits issued
annually. Comparison across MSAs demonstrates that the expected direct correlation between
ownership housing supply changes and changes in price emerges only in the second half of the
data (Figure 6).
Figure 6
Ownership Stock and Price Changes
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In Atlanta and Detroit, for example, prior to 1974 changes in price and permit issuance exhibit
no, or negative correlation. Correlation coefficients calculated for the years 1963-1973 range
from -0.34 in Atlanta to only as high as 0.10 in Boston. However, in the 20 years since, the two
series track each other much more closely, with correlations for this time period ranging from
0.49 in Atlanta to almost 0.80 in Boston.
In Atlanta, large rises in unit authorizations from 1980 to 1985 closely follow price rises of the
same time. Likewise, price decreases in the late 80s are mimicked by decreases in unit
authorizations. While Houston exhibits little early correlation, improved positive correlation
between the two series emerges from 1979 through 1985. However, the two series again become
uncorrelated, especially in the 1990s, with house prices rising in the face of stagnant permit
issuance. Finally, while Boston's price and permit issuance are positively correlated during all 30
years of the series, correlation appears even stronger in the latter part of the series.
Improvement in correlation between price and supply changes in the latter two thirds of the data
is an important phenomenon, because, as is described in the first portion of this chapter, data
from the FHLB and Freddie Mac were spliced in that year. This suggests that problems may
exist with the utilized FHLB price series.
Multi-family permit issuance exhibits a clearer and more consistent positive correlation with rent
changes (Figure 7) than correlation between single-family issuance and price.
Figure 7
Rental Stock and Rent Changes
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Rents and multi-family permit issuance are positively correlated in all cities from 1963 through
1994. Correlation coefficients calculated using the entire thirty year series range from 0.26 in
Detroit to as high as 0.40 in Atlanta, demonstrating stronger correlation than between single-
family permits and price in all cities except Boston. However, the nature of this positive
L-
1 1 1 1 i 1 1
correlation changes over time. In all four cities, in approximately the first one third of the data
series, permit issuance precedes changes in rent, instead of the expected opposite relationship.
This reverses in the second half of the series with rent increases preceding permit issuance
increases by at least one year.
The correlation between multi-family permits and supply is less-than-ideal is superior to that
between single-family permits and price particularly in the first 10 years of the series. In this
time period, correlation coefficients between single-family permits and price were negative in
three MSAs and nearly zero in the other, while those for rent and multi-family permits are all
positive, ranging from 0.12 in Detroit to 0.41 in Atlanta. This lends further support to the theory
that weaker-than-expected trends and relationships on the ownership side of the market may be
directly tied to problems with the house price data series.
3.4.6.2 Demand
On the renter-occupied housing demand side, Equation (8) specifies that rents and lagged prices
are directly related to one another: increases in prices force households out of the ownership
market, thus increasing demand for rental housing. However, comparison of data in the four
MSAs shows that, like comparison of price and single-family permits, the expected correlation
occurs only in the second, Freddie Mac, section of the data series (Figure 8).
Figure 8
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In all four MSAs, rent and price have negative or low correlations before 1974, with correlation
coefficients ranging from as low as -0.96 in Atlanta to 0.05 in Houston. This negative
relationship is particularly apparent in Atlanta, where between 1963 and 1976, real prices grow
by close to 45% while real rents fall by almost 30%. Since 1980, however, the hypothesized
price-rent relationship emerges, with strong positive correlation between the two variables,
particularly in Atlanta and Houston. However. this is insufficient to make up for earlier negative
correlation, resulting in disappointing correlation coefficient between rent and lagged price in the
four cities: -0.29 in Atlanta, 0.12 in Boston, -0.21 in Detroit, and 0.16 in Houston
Owner demand (in the form of price) also demonstrates an inconsistent relationship with one of
its primary determinants: employment.
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Again, while correlation is never strong, it improves markedly in the latter half of the data series.
Correlation coefficients in Atlanta and Detroit are -0.06 and -0.23 in the first ten year of the
series (when the FHLB price data are used). In the latter 10-15 years, a stronger positive
relationship emerges in the two cities, with correlation coefficients increasing to 0.20 and 0.40,
respectively. In Boston and Houston, the first half of the series is marked by non- correlation,
followed by an improving positive relationship in the 1980s and 1990s.
Finally, rents also demonstrate weak correlation with employment (Figure 10).
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Atlanta and Detroit have markedly better positive correlation coefficients of 0.26 and 0.40,
respectively, for the whole thirty year series than do Boston and Houston, which have correlation
coefficients Of only 0.11 and -0.19 respectively. More important than inconsistent correlation
from MSA to MSA, however, is the fact that correlation coefficients do not change
systematically when data before and after 1974 is considered separately.
3.4.7 Section Conclusion
Trend analysis demonstrates that, even before performing regressions to test hypothesized
relationships, several important concerns arise:
e Inconsistent movements in price, permit, and income data suggest that the four MSA housing
markets may be segmented, with changes in different variables occurring independently at
very different points from city to city. Atlanta's, Houston's, and Detroit's price and rent
cycles differ markedly from Boston's; while Atlanta's, Detroit's, and Boston's multi family
supply changes differ from those in Houston. Single-family supply changes differ in each
MSA.
* Comparisons of data trends within cities lends only partial support to the hypothesized
determinants of supply and demand. Rent and price increases do not always precede
increased supply, and employment changes do not always precede changes in demand for
rental and ownership housing. However, there does appear to be a general tracking of rents
and prices with economic growth and of supply changes with changes in prices and rents.
* Inconsistent relationships may be partly explained by problems in the first half of the price
data series, which is comprised of FHLB data. This hypothesis is supported by the
especially weak relationships that exist from 1963 to 1973 between price and single-family
permits, rent, and employment. This same especially weak relationship in the first one third
of the data series is not apparent between rent and permits and employment.
4. Results and Analysis of Demand Models
4.1 Chapter Introduction
This chapter discusses the results of applying the demand models (for both owner- and renter-
occupied housing - equations (9) and (16), respectively ) developed in Chapter 2 to the data
described in Chapter 3. Results indicate that price, user costs, and stock have a strong and
expected influence on demand for owner- and renter-occupied housing in all four MSAs.
However, the influences of demographic variables on both owner and rental demand as well as
of price on rental demand are unclear from city to city. Data problems are one possible
explanation for these unexpected results.
4.2 Results and Analysis of Ownership Demand Estimation
Estimation of owner demand yields clear results about the influences of price, user costs, and
historic stock. The results of estimation of the hypothesized determination of ownership demand
are presented for each city in the columns entitled Equation 9 in Table 1 below.
Table 1'
Ownershin Demand Pctimation mapn
Constant 39.94
(2.16)
128.11
(7.92)
53.09
(2.11)
124.96
(8.17)
114.92
(2.83)
35.68
(0.65)
64.35
(2.68)
278.71
(8.27)
U2, -17.04 -38.77 -6.88 -44.27 -10.20 -23.77
(-1.68) (-2.68) (-0.64) (-3.81) (-1.01) (-0.98)
U2- -24.30 -54.4
(-4.74) (-4.68)
SF/E, -0.18 -0.20
(-2.59) (-1.23)
SF,,/E, -0.12 -0.27 -0.14 0.001
(-1.33) (-1.99) (-2.93) (0.03)
SF2,,/E, -0.01 -0.16
(-0.11) (-1.09)
P, 0.67 0.17 0.71 0.79
(5.80) (1.22) (5.27) (10.91)
WAGE, 0.02 -0.01 0.40 -0.06 -0.005 0.57 -0.29 -0.65
(0.33) (-0.07) (4.05) (-0.63) (-0.02) (2.36) (-3.91) (-4.05)
SIZE, 14.96 27.24 -28.39 13.37 -0.74 -9.60 35.72 -4.67
(1.25) (1.51) (-5.07) (0.68) (-0.19) (-1.80) (1.75) (-0.10)
R2  0.73 0.33 0.98 0.51 0.79 0.55 0.94 0.62
Adjusted R2  0.67 0.22 0.98 0.43 0.75 0.47 0.93 0.56
Dur.-Wat. 2.54 0.95 1.36 0.87 1.85 0.95 1.40 0.54
Price Elas. -0.50 -9.64 -0.33 -0.23
Interest Elas. -0.03 .0001 -0.01 -0.01
Equation 9 in each of the cities provides generally strong goodness-of-fit, with R2s ranging from
0.73 to 0.98. Substituting different measures and lags of stock (SF) and user costs (U) in the four
markets improved results, presumably because of local differences in ownership markets. In
Atlanta, Detroit, and Houston, the current measure of U2 (the calculation of which is defined by
(5)) is used, while the same measure is lagged in estimating demand in Boston. In U2, expected
price appreciation is based on the historic price appreciation of two previous periods is
subtracted from nominal interest rates. This is in contrast to the one period of historic
appreciation included in Ul, which yielded weaker results. In addition, different measures of the
stock-to-employment ratio were used. In Atlanta and Detroit, a lagged stock was used in the
ratio. In Houston, current stock was used. Finally, in Boston a recalculated version of the
lagged stock, calculated with current rather than lagged permits, was used instead.
The results tell a clear story. With the exception of Boston, lagged price consistently plays a
very important role. Its coefficient receives not only the expected positive sign, but is highly
" T-Statistics are provided in parentheses below the values of coefficients.
significant. This supports the theory that price gradually adjusts to changes in demand, moving
to only 21-33% of long run equilibrium in the first year following a shock in Atlanta, Detroit,
and Houston. A comparison of Equation 9 to Equation 9a in Table 1 shows the effects of
omitting lagged price. In all cities, exclusion of lagged price leads to large drops in R 2s and, in
Atlanta, Boston and Houston, leads to sign changes on wage and stock coefficients. Finally, the
generally higher significance levels of coefficients in the equations without lagged price do not
necessarily indicate that these models are more reliable predictors of demand. As was described
in the previous chapter, T-statistics rise in these equations because of a weakness in the OLS
methodology: inclusion of correlated independent variables causes significance levels to
decrease. In this case, the correlation of price with other independent variables causes
significance levels to drop markedly when it is included.
Coefficients of the user cost variable (U2) also support the hypotheses inherent in equation (3).
In all four cities, it has the expected negative sign, but is significant at a 5% level of significance
in Boston only. Despite these significance problems, the consistently negative sign on the
coefficient demonstrates that user costs have the expected inverse relationship with housing
demand: as nominal mortgage rates increase, ownership housing becomes more costly and
demand for it decreases. Calculation of interest elasticites with respect to stock demonstrates
that U2 also has inverse relationship with quantity demanded in the expected magnitude. The
elasticites are interpreted to mean that a one percentage point increase in interest rate causes
between a 1% and 3% decline in the number of units demanded. 16
The inclusion of expected appreciation in the calculation of user costs also suggests that
backward looking house price appreciation expectations have a positive effect on demand. That
is, as people expect the rate of appreciation of their houses to increase, housing appears less
expensive and demand therefore increases. The high level of significance of the coefficient of
U2 (and lagged U2 in Boston) demonstrates that households look farther back (two years rather
than one in Ul) in forming their expectations about future appreciation. It is difficult to explain
why a lagged measure of U2 provides a superior fit in Boston.
16 Interest elasticity = L5 (U2mean * Emean") , where p4 and $5 are defined by (9).
P 4 SFmean
Stock also interacts with demand in a consistent and expected manner. Coefficients of the stock
variable are of the expected sign in Equation 1 for each of the four cities, and are statistically
significant in both Detroit and Houston. These negative signs suggest that as ownership housing
supply increases, price is negatively affected. The superior results of using lagged stock in
Atlanta, Boston, and Houston further supports the hypothesis that prices adjust slowly to market
changes. In these three cities, changes in stock of one period earlier have a much stronger
relationship with price than do changes during the current period. This gradual adjustment of
price to supply is consistent with current theory. Case and Shiller's research, for example,
demonstrates through use of a Weighted Repeat Sale index that prices move slowly, exhibiting
significant serial correlation [4]. If this is the case, current prices may be much more related to
the stock of one or more prior periods than today's stock. Low Durbin Watson statistics
produced for most regression equations when lagged price is excluded support this serial
correlation hypothesis.
Price elasticities with respect to stock are also of the expected magnitude in all cities except for
Boston, ranging from -0.50 to -0.23.'1 Hendershott and Shilling explain why such inelastic
demand is not surprising:
Substantial concern arose in the 1970s regarding the 'affordability' of owner
occupied housing. House price increases generally exceeded increases in other
prices, and a rising inflation premium was incorporated into mortgage interest
rates. As a result, the ratio of the monthly mortgage payment on a constant
quality house to average household income rose sharply. In spite of this
increase, the homeownership rate in the United States climbed throughout the
1970s. [12]
Households have thus historically shown a willingness to buy single family homes, even in the
face of its quickly rising real costs.
Finally, the exogenous economic and demographic variables WAGE (income/employment) and
SIZE (population/employment) yield weak results. WAGE has the unexpected sign in Detroit
and Houston, suggesting that an increase in income per worker there reduces demand for
1 -p( P * E, a17 Price elasticity = P mean ean , where 4 and p3 are defined by (9).(4 SFmean
ownership housing. WAGE's coefficient in Atlanta and Boston is of the expected sign, but is
significant only in Boston. Similarly SIZE, a measure of poverty, has the unexpected sign in
Atlanta and Houston, suggesting that reduced work force participation in that city improves
demand for ownership housing. SIZE has the expected sign in Boston and Detroit, but is
statistically significant only in Boston. The mixed results associated with these variables may be
caused by two things. First, as was discussed in Chapter 3, employment may be an inappropriate
proxy for households, causing the variable to interact with price in unexpected ways. Second, it
may be inappropriate to apply a single economic model to demographically and economically
diverse metropolitan areas.
4._ Results and Analysis of Rental Demand Estimation
The regression results for rental housing demand are similar to those for ownership demand:
stock and lagged rent have much stronger and more consistent relationships to demand than
demographic influences. Yet the results of tests of the interaction between owner and renter
markets are mixed. The results of estimation of the hypothesized determination of rental
demand (equation (16) in Chapter 2) are presented for each city in the columns entitled Eq. 16 in
Table 2 below. The effects of removing interaction with the ownership market (i.e. U2t and Ps1)
is seen in Equation 16a.
Table 2'"
Rental Demand Estimation (Dependent V
Constant 49.54
(3.80)
30.68
(3.85)
17.09
(1.74)
21.78
(2.13)
9.12
(0.82)
16.54
(1.28)
43.02
(2.84)
45.22
(3.30)
U2, -23.77 4.15 -13.43 4.28
(-2.24) (0.91) (-2.61) (0.64)
MF,/E, -0.05 -0.10 -0.21 -0.17 -0.03 -0.10 -0.14 -0.11
(-1.14) (-4.82) (-4.23) (-5.97) (-0.85) (-2.43) (-4.16) (4.60)
R, 0.85 0.90 0.36 0.58 0.73 0.81 0.40 0.58
(8.66) (14.19) (2.69) (7.53) (9.14) (9.28) (2.28) (5.79)
WAGE, -0.04 -0.03 0.26 0.25 0.21 0.05 0.12 0.11
(-0.88) (-0.61) (3.80) (5.05) (2.61) (0.64) (1.64) (1.71)
SIZE, -0.52 2.12 24.75 14.20 9.31 6.99 18.07 9.41
(-0.10) (0.71) (3.72) (5.83) (2.45) (1.78) (2.24) (3.05)
P. -0.20 0.20 -0.26 0.09
(-1.26) (1.98) (-4.26) (1.27)
R2  0.98 0.98 0.96 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98
Adjusted R2  0.98 0.98 0.94 0.93 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.98
Dur.-Wat. 1.35 1.03 1.50 1.23 1.10 0.81 0.94 1.06
Rent Elas. -1.52 -0.51 -0.74 -0.60 -4.57 -0.96 -1.53 -1.37
As in the ownership market, using lagged demand produces the strongest regression results. The
coefficient of lagged rent in each of the four metropolitan areas is both highly significant and of
the expected sign. This supports the hypothesis that rents are slow to adjust to changing demand,
moving to only 15% of equilibrium levels in Atlanta and 64% of equilibrium levels in Boston
within one year of a shock.'9 The importance of lagged rent is also seen when it is eliminated
from the equation. In Table 3 below, Eq. 16 for each city remains the same as in Table 2,
representing the determination of rental demand hypothesized in (8). In equation 16b, this
relationship is altered by removing lagged rent from demand estimation.
18 T-Statistics are provided in parentheses below the values of coefficients.
'9 The adjustment rate is calculated as one minus the coefficient on the lagged rent variable. This
relationship between price and lagged price is derived from (6) in Chapter 2, which states:
P, = TP,* + (l-t)P,,
Table 320
Constant 49.54
(3.80)
27.95 17.09 18.41 9.12 6.48 43.02
(1.06) (1.74) (1.66) (0.82) (0.27) (284)
54.20
(3.47)
U2, -23.77 -55.54 4.15 12.70 -13.43 -29.82 4.28 5.46
(-2.24) (-2.71) (0.91) (3.49) (-2.61) (-2.88) (0.64) (0.75)
MF,,/E, -0.05 -0.16 -0.21 -0.30 -0.03 -0.21 -0.14 -0.20
(-1.14) (-2.02) (-4.23) (-8.40) (-0.85) (-2.67) (-4.16) (-7.44)
R, 0.85 0.36 0.73 0.40
(8.66) (2.69) (9.14) (2.28)
WAGE -0.04 36.19 0.26 0.35 0.21 0.59 0.12 0.09
(-0.88) (6.48) (3.80) (5.26) (2.61) (4.19) (1.64) (1.20)
SIZE -0.52 36.19 24.75 41.02 9.31 41.56 18.07 34.06
(-0._10) (6.48) (3.72) (13.06) (2.45) (13.68) (2.24) (7.96)
P. -0.20 0.44 0.20 0.39 -0.26 -0.38 0.09 0.22
(-1.26) (0.44) (1.98) (4.90) (-4.26) (-2.99) (1.27) (4.80)
R2 0.98 0.93 0.96 0.94 0.99 0.93 0.98 0.97
Adjusted R2  0.98 0.91 0.94 0.93 0.98 0.92 0.97 0.97
Dur.-Wat. 1.35 0.98 1.50 1.52 1.10 0.83 0.94 0.76
In all cities, the exclusion of lagged rent causes a reduction of R2s, though much less dramatic
than in the ownership market, and increased autoregressiveness (as measured by Durbin Watson
Test Statistics).. However, because the strong trends present in most time series equations
usually generate high R2s, such small differences can be important indicators of improved
goodness-of-fit. The apparently smaller effect of lagged demand in the rent market suggests that
rents may move more efficiently than prices.
Finally, as in the case for ownership demand, generally increased T-statistics in equations
without lagged rent do not necessarily indicate that these equations are more reliable estimators
of rental demand. Instead, lagged rent is highly correlated with other included independent
variables, resulting in lower T-scores upon its inclusion. Lagged rent's high level of significance
when included, as well as the strong theoretical bases for its inclusion suggests that it must not
be ignored.
Lagged multi-family stock also demonstrates expected effects on rental housing demand. Its
coefficient is of the expected sign in all cities and is significant at a 5% level of significance in
all cities except Atlanta. The negative sign of stock's coefficient corresponds with theory, which
dictates that supply increases lead to decreased prices. The improvements in fit and significance
obtained from using lagged instead of current stock further suggest that rents are slow to adjust
20 T-Statistics are provided in parentheses below the values of coefficients.
to market changes, with at least some of the same serial correlation demonstrated to exist in the
price series. Such clear conclusions are contradicted by the calculation of rent elasticity with
respect to stock. Though elasticities are all of the expected sign (supporting the theory that rents
and stock are inversely related), their magnitudes vary widely, suggesting that quantity
demanded in some markets is much more sensitive to rent changes than others.2'
Like ownership demand, rental demand demonstrates unclear and inconsistent relationships with
the demographic variables. The results included in Table 2 indicate that in no city are SIZEt and
WAGEt both significant and of the expected sign. While wage often has the correct sign, it is
significant only in Boston and Detroit. SIZEt has the expected negative sign only in Boston,
where it receives a very low T-Statistic. These mixed results for demographic variables, like
those in the price equations, may be caused by the weakness of employment as a proxy for
households, or by the inappropriateness of applying a single economic model to diverse markets.
Finally, and in contrast to the results obtained by Wheaton and DiPasquale, regression results
lend only mixed support to the hypothesized interaction of the rental and housing markets. In
this case, the interaction was represented with two variables, ownership costs of capital (U2t),
and lagged price (Pt-). Ownership costs were expected to have a positive coefficient, because
rises in them should displace people from the ownership market, raising the demand for rental
units. However, the results (Equation 16 for each city in Table 2) do not always support this
hypothesis. Ownership costs in Atlanta and Detroit have coefficients with the expected sign, but
their T-statistics are not even significant at the 10% level of significance. These coefficients in
Boston and Houston are statistically significant, but have the wrong sign. The coefficient of
house price has the expected sign only in Boston and Houston, but is not significant in either.
Compounding these problems, price and ownership costs apparently do not contribute much to
goodness-of-fit. In Equation 16a for each city in Table 2, the two ownership market variables
were omitted, resulting in equivalent R2s and generally higher significance levels. Only Durbin-
Watson Test statistics deteriorate in these equations.
21 Rent elasticity = ( Rmean *Ean where and pare defined by (16).
R4 MF4ean 7
4,4_ Chapter Conclusions
These estimation results support several conclusions. First, only some variables have the same
sign and significance levels across all four MSAs. While independent variables such as stock,
lagged price, and lagged rent have expected relationships with demand, others, such as
demographic and ownership market variables have coefficients that vary in sign and significance
from city to city. The fact that the demographic variables do not appear to contribute much
explanatory power may be explained by the use of employment, which is likely a poor proxy for
a more desirable but unavailable measure of households.
A second conclusion made clear by these results is that owner and rental markets fail to
demonstrate expected interactions in the four MSAs. Coefficients of price (P) and user costs
(U2) in estimation of rental demand show varying signs and significance levels from city to city.
These poor results are likely connected to the unclear quality of the FHLB data used to construct
the first half of the price series. The negative correlation between price and rent during this first
part of the series (described in Chapter 3) may cause sign changes and lower significance levels
for both lagged price and user cost variables in the rental demand equation.
5. Results and Analysis of Supply Models
5.1 Chapter Introduction
This Chapter reports the results of various regression analyses applying the supply models (for
both owner and renter-occupied housing, equations (18) and (19), respectively) developed in
Chapter 2 to the data described in Chapter 3. Results vary considerably between MSAs and
between ownership and rental markets. Single-family supply regression results are the most
problematic, generating coefficients of varying signs and significance levels, as well as generally
low R2s. Multi-family supply models produce better results across all MSAs. Coefficients in
these models are more often significant and have the expected sign. Data problems and market
segmentation are again posed as explanations for unexpected results.
5.2 Results and Analysis of Ownership Supply Estimation
Results indicate that Equation (18) is a poor estimator of supply changes within each city and
that its weaknesses and strengths are inconsistent across MSAs. These results are presented in
Equation 18 for each city in Table 4 below. Equation 18a demonstrates the effects of including
lagged permits (the approximate change in supply of the preceding period).
Table 422
Constant 4,648.7
(0.45)
8,725.1
(1.14)
4,989.4
(1.62)
2,119.6 45,666.3
(0.56) (6.09)
30,541.1
(3.23)
-29,796.6
(-3.78)
-14,672.6
(-1 83)
P, 454.06 49.72 265.10 212.28 183.44 47.33 387.80 410.82
(1.86) (0.25) (6.66) (3.68) (2.02) (0.47) (2.66) (3.33)
P, -503.89 -151.39 -250.10 -214.87 -142.44 -69.29 -314.19 -396.17
(-2.22) (-0.83) (-6.20) (-4.40) (-1.56) (-0.77) (-1.99) (-2.92)
TBILL, 295.38 90.95 -156.11 -167.96 -528.54 -485.83 722.73 531.72
(1.04) (0.42) (-2.03) (-2.19) (-2.61) (-2.59) (1.41) (1.22)
SF 0.03 0.01 0.001 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 0.03
(4.12) (1.22) (0.19) (0.74) (-5.56) (-2.12) (8.06) (3.02)
SFP,, 0.72 0.23 0.42 0.53
(4.75) (1.26) (2.35) (3.39)
R2 0.41 0.69 0.65 0.67 0.66 0.72 0.75 0.83
Adjusted R 0.32 0.63 0.60 0.61 0.60 0.66 0.72 0.80
Dur.-Wat. 0.82 1.24 1.68 1.88 1.49 2.02 0.81 1.95
22 T-Statistics are provided in parentheses below the values of coefficients.
None of the model specifications in Table 4 resulted in coefficients that are all statistically
significant and of the expected signs. Price and lagged price exhibit the strongest and most
consistent relationship to changes in the supply of owner housing. The coefficients of both
variables have the correct sign in all cities, and price is significant in Equation I of all cities
except Atlanta. In addition, in Boston, Detroit, and Houston, the sum of the coefficients on the
two variables is positive, supporting the theory that demand for owner-occupied housing should
increase permanently after a positive shock to supply or other variables. While incorrect signs
on stock coefficients make long run price elasticities impossible to estimate meaningfully, it is
possible to interpret coefficients directly. In Boston, Detroit, and Houston (where the price and
lagged price coefficients have the expected positive sum), a long run increase in prices of $1
leads to a permanent increase of between 15 and 71 unit authorizations per year.
Other variables produce weaker results. The lagged stock variable, which is a proxy for
construction costs, has the worst results. Its coefficient has the unexpected sign in all cities
except Detroit. A positive coefficient on stock contradicts theory by implying that increased
construction costs may stimulate production of single-family housing. TBILL, a measure of
short-term interest rates, though significant and of the expected sign in Boston and Detroit, has
the opposite sign and is insignificant in Atlanta and Detroit, suggesting that increased costs of
construction borrowing in these cities is positively rather than negatively associated with
construction activity. Finally, the strongest evidence of the weakness of the hypothesized owner
stock determination is poor goodness-of-fit statistics: in no city does Equation 1 ever explain
more than 75% of the change in permit issuance, and in Atlanta it explains only 41%. These R2s
are especially low for time series regression.
The results also indicate the difficulty of attempting to apply a single model to different MSAs.
If significance or sign problems existed for a given variable in all cities, one might conclude that
a problem in the specification of supply variables existed for all cities. However, in the
equations above, two out of the four independent variables - TBILL and SF- have differing signs
in different cities. This suggests that these cities have differing relationships with these variables
and may have different determinants of owner supply.
Because of the disappointing results of Equation 1, particularly R2s, the hypothesis that changes
in supply adjust slowly to changes in the market was tested. This meant including a lagged
version of single-family permits (the dependent variable). Results (Equation 2 for all cities in
Table 3 above) support this hypothesis. Not only did the coefficients on the lagged dependent
variable have the expected sign and were significant in all cities except for Boston, but inclusion
of the variable raised R 2s considerably. The coefficient on lagged permit symbolizes the
proportion of long run equilibrium that permitsfail to adjust in the year immediately following a
shock. In Atlanta, for example, permits are especially slow to adjust, moving to only 28% of
their long-run equilibrium in the year following a shock.
5.3 Results and Analysis of Rental Supply Estimation
The estimation of rental supply (as specified in (19)) was more successful than for ownership
supply, but the coefficient signs and significance levels remain inconsistent from MSA to MSA
for many variables. Equation 19 for each city in Table 5 below shows the results of supply
determination while Equation 19a demonstrates the effects of including lagged multi-family
permits (the dependent variable) to model gradual changes in supply.
Constant
-43,811
(-2.26)
-10,660
(-0.48)
Table 5"
ition (Deendent V
-2,350 5,457
(-023) 1 (0.58) F-94,656(-4.51) -73,266(-2.22) -/ /,194(-2.86) -32,554(-1 32)
R, 1,695.4 1,193.0 516.15 337.91 1,046.3 976.55 1,854.0 1,630.6
(6.21) (3.72) (3.75) (2.51) (4.96) (4.29) (6.25) (6.46)
-1,360.4 -1,080.0 -373.93 -311.21 -478.50 -525.83 -1,368.0 -1,425.0
(-5.38) (-4.21) (-2.74) (-2.56) (-2.67) (-2.79) (-5.00) (-6.31)
TBILL, -33.76 -359.31 -43.95 -186.27 29.49 8.10 1,671.06 968.88
(-0.08) (-0.90) (-0.19) (-0.92) (0.16) (0.04) (4.13) (2.51)
MF,, 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.02
(2.05) (0.53) (-2.16) (-1.39) (3.70) (1.90) (2.82) (1.32)
HUD, 84.03 59.64 41.10 28.00 -5.28 -0.93 130.79 89.33
(4.96) (3.26) (4.54) (3.08) (-0.46) (-0.07) (5.84) (4.10)
MFP,, 0.37 0.44 0.16 0.41
(2.47) | L(2.93) | _ (0.85) (3.58)
R2  0.74 0.80 0.76 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.80 0.87
Adjusted R2  0.69 0.75 0.72 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.76 0.84
Dur.-Wat. 1.34 1.81 1.18 1.97 1.90 2.20 1.21 1.90
Long Run 2.08 0.83 8.11 2.52
Price Elas. I I I _E
As in estimation of owner supply, the only variables that produce expected, consistent results are
rent and lagged rent. The coefficients of both variables have the correct sign in all cities, and all
are significant. In addition, in all cities, the sum of the coefficients is positive, supporting the
hypothesized permanent increase in demand expected from a positive shock to supply or other
variables. While incorrect signs on stock coefficients make calculation of meaningful price
elasticities impossible in Equation 1, direct interpretation of coefficients suggests that a long run
$1 increase in rents leads to a long run increase of between 568 and 143 multi-family unit
authorizations per year.
As in single family supply estimation, other results are disappointing. The coefficient on TBILL
has the correct sign in Atlanta and Boston, but is not significant at a 5% significance level in
both. In Detroit and Houston, it is significant but with the wrong sign, suggesting a positive
relationship between short-term borrowing costs and multi-family housing production. Lagged
multi-family stock also produces poor results, generating coefficients of the wrong sign in all
cities except Boston, where it is significant. Finally, government production of multi-family
housing (HUD) has the expected positive relationship with permit issuance (because the measure
of permit issuance used in this study includes government building approvals) and is significant
in all cities except Detroit, where its actually negative.
2' T-Statistics are provided in parentheses below the values of coefficients.
Equation 19a for each city again demonstrates that additions to supply, in this case rental supply,
are slow to respond to market changes. In all cities, coefficients of this variable are of the
expected sign and, with the exception of Detroit, are significant. The coefficients suggest that
permits adjust to only between 84% and 56% of their long-run equilibrium level in response to a
shock in any of the four metropolitan areas. Addition of lagged permits also contributes to much
better R2 and Durbin Watson Test statistics. Finally, the coefficient on lagged permits can be
used to calculate a long run price elasticity with respect to permits. These elasticities suggest
that, although lagged permits may demonstrate the expected relationship with current permits in
all cities, the strength of that relationship varies. In Detroit, for example, supply is extremely
elastic, with a 1% long run increase in price causing more than an 8% increase in long-run
permit issuance. In the Boston market, however, supply is inelastic and a 1% increase in long
run price causes an increase in long-run permit issuance of only 0.8%.
54 Chapter Conclusions
Much room for improvement remains in accurately estimating housing supply. Results indicate
that both ownership and rental supply are strongly affected by price and rent. In addition,
inclusion of lagged supply changes in both markets improves goodness-of-fit. However, the
disappointing goodness-of-fit statistics in almost all equations, even after including other
exogenous variables, suggest that price and rent are not by themselves sufficient predictors of
single-and multi-family supply. Like the supply models estimated by other scholars, results fail
to clarify what other factors are important determinants of supply.
The single family models are the most problematic, with estimated coefficients that vary widely
between MSAs and relationships between ownership supply and its hypothesized determinants
within MSAs that defy theory. Rental supply estimation results, while superior to those for
ownership supply, also have important sign and significance problems, particularly on T-Bill
24 1___ 2 __R_,Rent Elas. with Respect to Permits = In , ,where ai, a2, and a 4 are defined by (19).
a4 MFPe
rates, lagged stock, and HUD completions. Multi-family supply elasticities also vary widely
from city to city.
Problems with supply estimation, like those for demand estimation, may be at least partially
explained by data weaknesses, segmentation of local housing markets, or both. In this case, the
use of permit data (which, as explained in Chapter 3, had the most collection problems) as the
dependent variable make data problems a more likely explanation. In addition, in the single
family market, the possibility that many owners purchase custom-built homes for service and
cultural reasons, rather than strictly for investment purposes may mean that supply changes are
dictated by more than traditional economic theory.
6. Conclusion
This thesis tests the hypothesis that the most recent theories of housing supply and demand
determination - those of Wheaton and DiPasquale - can be used to predict housing market
changes at the metropolitan level. Results of this test, however, are mixed.
Demand estimation for both ownership and rental housing is most successful, producing results
that are more consistent across metropolitan areas. Independent variables such as stock, lagged
price, and lagged rent have clear and expected relationships with demand. Others, however, such
as demographic and ownership market variables have coefficients that vary in sign and
significance from city to city. These mixed results on demographic variables may be explained
by the study's use of employment data, which is likely a poor proxy for a more desirable but
unavailable measure of households. Demand estimation results also fail to support hypothesized
interaction between owner and renter markets across MSAs. These poor results may be
connected to the unclear quality of the FHLB data used to construct the first half of the price
series.
Estimation of supply using Wheaton's and DiPasquale's hypothesized determinants produces
results that are even less clear. While results do support the hypothesis that price and rent are
strong but insufficient estimators of supply, varying signs, significance levels, and elasticites on
variables such as interest rates, lagged stock, and public housing production suggest that other
determinants may be inconsistent from market to market. Problems in collection of permit data,
as well as the possible economically irrational behavior of single family housing markets may
explain disappointing results of supply estimation.
It is impossible to determine if the mixed results presented in this thesis arise from data problems
or problems in tested hypotheses about housing market operation, or both. In order to better
eliminate the former of these two explanations, future studies may improve on this one by using
different data. First, researchers should attempt to construct and utilize a constant quality
housing price index that has sufficiently large sample sizes at the metropolitan level. In addition,
in order to better include hypothesized interactions of demography with demand, variables
measuring changes in the number of households - not employment - at the MSA level are
extremely desirable. Finally, accurate measures of annual changes in the housing stock are also
needed. If such improved data is utilized, and continues to generate results that differ between
metropolitan areas, it may be more decisively concluded that general hypotheses about the
operation of the overall ownership and rental housing markets are insufficient to explain many of
the eccentricities of local housing market operation.
7. Appendix
Exhibit 1
Atlanta Data
1962 n/a n/a 9,791 12,890 238,030 239,478 97,314 n/a n/a n/a
1963 67.32 147.06 10,541 12,806 244,332 246,038 106,036 429.0 1,431.5 12.72
1964 72.25 145.16 10,639 9,244 251,117 252,659 114,700 453.2 1,487.9 13.58
1965 71.94 144.13 10,898 9,546 257,965 259,441 120,955 482.5 1,558.3 14.01
1966 71.88 141.67 7,668 9,046 264,980 264,213 127,414 516.1 1,605.3 15.06
1967 77.44 140.12 9,461 13,325 269,916 270,101 133,534 533.4 1,652.3 15.92
1968 80.14 137.93 10,102 14,274 276,006 276,388 142,550 564.3 1,708.5 16.95
1969 88.25 134.60 8,879 14,530 282,508 281,914 152,207 638.8 1,742.4 18.17
1970 89.02 132.73 10,139 20,3491 288,224 288,224 162,038 656.5 1,773.1 18.77
1971 87.03 131.60 14,721 33,924 297,658 301,708 180,777 679.0 1,832.0 19.78
1972 89.91 131.10 16,691 20,678 311,357 316,997 212,017 720.2 1,893.3 21.94
1973 89.82 126.80 13,699 10,770 326,888 329,545 231,059 770.5 1,959.5 23.42
1974 92.65 118.86 7,820 5,217 339,636 336,709 240,977 836.5 2,011.9 23.34
1975 93.54 112.27 7,441 931 346,912 343,525 245,781 830.0 2,029.3 22.84
1976 86.34 108.08 8,728 1,120 353,837 351,519 246,639 861.9 2,052.8 24.01
1977 89.97 104.62 10,707 3,015 361,958 361,327 247,670 910.8 2,093.3 25.43
1978 82.62 100.61 11,284 2,823 371,922 371,663 250,446 1,011.2 2,132.8 26.96
1979 82.14 98.21 12,727 5,9311 382,422 383,322 253,046 1,060.0 2,191.8 27.45
1980 81.97 95.63 11,947 5,338 394,265 394,265 258,508 1,086.5 2,247.6 27.63
1981 78.43 97.03 9,370 5,319 403,060 519,180 263,944 1,116.1 2,299.2 28.28
1982 77.83 96.99 13,246 6,217 415,493 415,494 269,360 1,129.3 2,344.2 28.83
1983 79.47 100.70 22,617 14,360 436,722 436,724 275,692 1,187.6 2,402.9 31.20
1990 81.46 102.02 23,093 16,153 458,397 458,400 290,316 1,289.5 2,475.5 34.64
1985 83.26 106.69 22,992 15,011 479,978 479,982 306,765 1,352.8 2,565.7 37.57
1986 87.99 112.04 22,591 15,014 501,182 501,188 322,052 1,410.8 2,663.0 40.94
1987 89.82 114.61 19,168 10,930 519,174 519,180 337,342 1,463.5 2,754.3 42.98
1988 90.23 113.36 17,141 12,643 535,262 535,270 348,473 1,540.7 2,834.1 45.08
1989 88.06 109.76 12,710 8,518 547,192 547,200 361,349 1,574.7 2,907.0 45.66
1990 83.92 105.51 11,938 5,138, 558,397 558,406 370,023 1,604.3 2,978.8 46.58
1991 81.68 102.20 12,624 1,216 570,247 570,256 375,256 1,574.0 3,057.7 46.71
1992 81.56 100.71 15,916 334 585,186 585,195 376,495 1,623.8 3,142.9 48.94
1993 81.65 100.28 17,952 2,312 602,036 602,047 376,835 1,711.1 3,237.5 51.33
1994 81.70 100.81 17,033 7,208 618,024 618,035 379,190 1,798.3 3,346.9 54.07
Exhibit 2
Boston Data
1962 n/a n/a 4,576 7,587 555,959 556,089 529,077 n/a n/a n/a
1963 21.26 115.69 4,462 8,080 557,111 557,212 539,442 1,093.2 4,596.4 44.46
1964 22.70 116.45 4,761 9,846 558,235 558,409 550,480 1,100.4 4,599.3 46.42
1965 23.55 116.83 7,969 5,123 559,433 560,414 563,932 1,127.7 4,639.8 46.66
1966 25.01 116.67 6,530 4,982 561,439 562,057 570,931 1,173.8 4,668.5 49.06
1967 27.17 114.37 6,086 7,983 563,083 563,588 577,737 1,216.3 4,709.2 51.79
1968 31.22 112.93 6,240 13,203 564,615 565,158 588,643 1,247.0 4,728.2 54.11
1969 33.87 113.35 4,967 9,605 566,186 566,407 606,681 1,281.5 4,758.3 55.92
1970 34.00 113.66 4,091 14,703 567,436 567,436 619,804 1,283.6 4,802.7 56.84
1971 38.83 115.80 6,315 14,952 576,219 580,984 633,043 1,265.6 4,832.9 57.82
1972 38.90 118.18 6,381 13,292 589,779 594,670 646,505 1,266.3 4,851.9 60.43
1973 39.98 117.34 6,040 13,272 603,478 607,627 658,473 1,296.8 4,855.4 61.79
1974 40.26 110.75 3,683 7,258 616,447 615,528 670,423 1,343.2 4,833.3 60.22
1975 40.92 106.32 4,412 4,931 624,355 624,991 676,958 1,316.9 4,813.4 58.62
1976 38.08 105.27 5,034 3,094 633,828 635,790 681,398 1,320.6 4,803.4 59.96
1977 38.81 104.79 5,549 4,672 644,637 647,694 684,184 1,382.4 4,797.5 61.29
1978 41.15 102.15 6,113 5,757 656,552 660,806 688,391 1,470.7 4,794.1 63.23
1979 44.23 96.42 4,964 4,719 669,676 671,454 693,575 1,505.9 4,793.0 63.33
1980 43.61 92.23 4,140 3,986 680,334 680,334 697,824 1,523.5 4,788.2 62.93
1981 44.88 93.62 4,108 4,106 682,709 682,692 704,976 1,535.3 4,808.4 63.56
1982 44.63 97.20 4,158 3,686 685,067 685,079 712,342 1,541.1 4,811.6 64.76
1983 48.04 100.60 6,660 4,000 687,453 688,902 718,956 1,588.2 4,835.3 68.22
1984 55.99 102.02 7,833 4,727 691,275 693,398 726,132 1,671.2 4,867.7 73.37
1985 68.66 106.41 9,213 7,931 695,770 698,686 734,614 1,697.5 4,899.0 76.52
1986 82.67 112.23 9,255 9,073 701,057 703,998 748,843 1,734.1 4,921.9 81.67
1987 90.84 116.02 8,395 8,004 706,368 708,817 765,120 1,777.3 4,940.5 84.91
1988 91.30 118.17 6,318 4,862 711,185 712,443 779,479 1,813.7 4,973.3 89.81
1989 87.43 120.97 4,711 2,622 714,811 715,147 788,202 1,946.4 5,000.3 89.71
1990 79.95 118.36 4,124 1,503 717,514 717,514 792,906 1,875.6 5,000.5 87.40
1991 72.91 114.24 4,587 679 719,880 720,147 795,602 1,762.9 4,980.3 85.27
1992 70.56 110.98 7,112 695 722,513 724,229 796,820 1,759.3 4,979.8 80.87
1993 69.48 108.44 6,602 1,124 726,594 728,019 798,068 1,786.6 4,992.3 82.31
1994 69.15 106.48 5,451 777 730,383 731,148 800,084 1,836.8 5,011.5 85.05
Exhibit 3
Detroit Data
1962 n/a n/a 6,417 4,854 875,140 874,787 287,041 n/a n/a n/a
1963 80.77 137.58 9,951 6,143 878,620 879,954 292,785 1,257.9 4,176.3 42.44
1964 79.02 136.45 13,301 8,846 884,016 886,862 300,054 1,320.9 4,238.0 44.75
1965 84.48 135.87 18,396 12,469 891,229 896,416 310,523 1,408.1 4,317.1 46.65
1966 86.55 135.19 14,132 9,884 901,205 903,755 325,279 1,490.2 4,378.4 49.40
1967 87.61 135.63 16,466 13,562 908,868 912,306 336,975 1,509.1 4,441.1 49.79
1968 90.70 134.20 13,203 15,405 917,797 919,163 353,025 1,560.8 4,459.1 52.66
1969 106.82 132.15 10,301 15,257 924,957 924,512 371,255 1,606.7 4,476.5 54.19
1970 102.23 130.15 11,613 10,108 930,543 930,543 389,311 1,586.9 4,499.6 52.54
1971 95.24 130.12 18,490 17,108 943,017 951,775 392,947 1,565.4 4,520.1 54.24
1972 88.42 130.14 13,035 15,813 962,879 966,743 399,101 1,611.6 4,513.0 58.22
1973 93.45 126.58 13,299 17,976 976,881 982,015 404,789 1,693.3 4,490.5 61.49
1974 95.62 119.07 8,132 10,020 991,167 991,353 411,255 1,754.2 4,473.0 58.69
1975 93.16 114.31 7,519 4,474 999,902 999,987 414,859 1,665.9 4,444.3 55.58
1976 91.98 112.48 10,188 5,407 1,007,979 1,011,686 416,468 1,727.7 4,408.8 59.34
1977 92.59 112.54 14,256 7,172 1,018,923 1,028,056 418,413 1,838.4 4,397.2 62.96
1978 102.87 112.88 13,136 8,168 1,034,237 1,043,140 420,993 1,887.2 4,398.3 65.21
1979 113.10 110.06 9,565 6,440 1,048,348 1,054,124 423,931 1,866.1 4,394.5 63.94
1980 104.56 106.55 3,917 3,624 1,058,622 1,058,622 426,248 1,730.8 4,378.2 59.51
1981 95.28 102.64 1,971 2,595 1,062,348 1,060,371 426,406 1,715.9 4,334.7 56.87
1982 87.40 100.52 1,413 2,543 1,064,223 1,061,624 426,520 1,623.5 4,277.0 54.14
1983 80.72 100.00 4,076 2,697 1,065,568 1,065,239 426,631 1,651.0 4,235.4 55.40
1984 78.26 99.52 5,259 4,378 1,069,445 1,069,903 426,749 1,741.4 4,230.4 58.94
1985 79.27 101.77 8,081 8,892 1,074,447 1,077,071 426,940 1,859.3 4,240.1 62.20
1986 84.39 107.30 9,257 10,647 1,082,133 1,085,281 427,329 1,886.7 4,254.1 65.35
1987 92.43 108.27 6,766 5,513 1,090,939 1,091,282 427,794 1,913.0 4,270.5 65.31
1988 96.80 107.27 5,721 10,132 1,097,374 1,096,355 428,035 1,924.2 4,258.2 66.76
1989 98.76 105.56 9,106 6,455 1,102,815 1,104,432 428,478 1,952.1 4,258.7 67.78
1990 99.11 104.44 7,944 3,983 1,111,477 1,111,477 428,760 1,960.5 4,269.3 66.91
1991 99.29 101.91 6,747 3,311 1,119,032 1,117,461 428,934 1,897.0 4,288.6 65.19
1992 100.24 99.36 8,225 3,072 1,125,450 1,124,755 429,079 1,903.4 4,307.6 66.92
1993 100.34 98.82 8,564 2,954 1,133,273 1,132,350 429,213 1,920.7 4,322.6 69.00
1994 103.21 98.18 8,750 3,755 1,141,419 1,140,110 429,343 1,975.5 4,347.7 71.84
Exhibit 4
Houston Data
1962 n/a n/a 5,799 12,727 416,783 416,868 87,449 n/a n/a n/a
1963 95.30 141.18 7,458 14,626 425,838 429,015 99,038 510.4 1,536.1 14.04
1964 92.50 139.68 6,085 10,888 437,483 438,926 112,357 533.2 1,585.5 14.82
1965 85.96 136.83 6,797 6,223 446,984 449,996 122,272 563.7 1,639.5 14.93
1966 83.21 134.57 6,043 6,463 457,597 459,838 127,939 604.9 1,676.8 15.92
1967 87.66 132.34 5,828 9,050 467,033 469,330 133,824 661.1 1,737.3 17.24
1968 97.21 129.60 5,976 15,435 476,133 479,063 142,065 718.8 1,825.2 18.68
1969 102.65 125.34 4,459 20,882 485,464 486,325 156,120 755.9 1,872.1 19.91
1970 104.98 121.65 3,746 18,249 492,426 492,426 175,136 767.5 1,913.9 20.93
1971 109.12 119.75 5,768 27,974 501,338 504,279 198,735 789.6 1,975.4 21.99
1972 108.66 117.22 6,518 24,384 515,061 517,673 234,911 842.9 2,028.6 23.68
1973 103.81 111.71 4,858 14,361 530,568 527,656 266,444 910.0 2,093.4 25.41
1974 102.24 104.06 3,557 6,003 542,126 534,966 285,015 1,026.7 2,165.3 27.28
1975 107.50 102.79 5,010 8,514 550,589 545,262 292,778 1,066.0 2,263.8 29.26
1976 119.94 108.79 7,786 17,577 562,509 561,262 303,788 1,124.2 2,359.9 31.98
1977 124.00 113.53 9,157 24,196 581,033 580,079 326,518 1,205.9 2,452.2 34.61
1978 133.40 110.43 29,839 29,029 602,818 641,397 357,807 1,306.4 2,555.2 38.32
1979 133.92 104.68 22,023 28,109 673,809 686,655 395,347 1,388.7 2,659.5 40.49
1980 123.51 97.94 19,247 17,441 726,206 726,206 431,698 1,469.8 2,786.9 42.09
1981 119.45 96.59 23,296 21,127 735,718 737,658 451,846 1,597.5 2,918.4 45.72
1982 125.73 102.28 27,131 41,924 747,232 750,994 476,253 1,592.3 3,107.6 47.53
1983 126.00 102.11 26,953 31,292 760,640 764,243 524,684 1,498.5 3,199.9 45.97
1984 113.92 95.86 15,472 16,729 773,960 771,848 560,834 1,550.5 3,223.0 47.13
1985 100.23 90.52 15,792 7,813 781,607 779,611 580,160 1,545.7 3,232.2 47.63
1986 95.68 88.41 13,943 1,666 789,411 786,465 589,186 1,455.8 3,275.5 45.80
1987 86.09 82.66 13,942 546 796,302 793,318 591,111 1,452.0 3,242.6 44.84
1988 82.40 77.94 15,331 3,000 803,192 800,854 591,741 1,523.2 3,260.9 46.57
1989 83.17 76.85 18,637 5,466 810,769 810,015 595,207 1,587.7 3,287.3 48.23
1990 82.64 78.50 20,271 5,402 819,979 819,979 601,522 1,684.4 3,343.0 50.49
1991 81.99 82.09 21,964 8,967 829,998 830,776 607,763 1,692.0 3,437.4 52.37
1992 83.04 84.53 24,160 8,373 840,853 842,652 618,122 1,689.5 3,530.4 54.70
1993 82.73 84.71 25,081 8,523 852,793 854,981 627,795 1,715.9 3,595.7 55.67
1994 82.05 85.02 25,587 14,954 865,189 867,559 637,640 1,743.3 3,704.6 57.83
Exhibit 5
National Data
1963 5.85 3.54 30.6 57
1964 5.83 3.95 31.0 60
1965 6.26 4.85 31.5 67
1966 6.38 4.29 32.4 72
1967 6.88 5.34 33.4 78
1968 7.67 6.67 34.8 117
1969 8.22 6.39 36.7 131
1970 7.56 4.33 38.8 183
1971 7.40 4.07 40.5 231
1972 7.80 7.03 41.8 194
1973 8.76 7.84 44.4 146
1974 8.92 5.80 49.3 68
1975 8.87 4.98 53.8 36
1976 8.82 5.27 56.9 39
1977 9.37 7.19 60.6 110
1978 10.59 10.07 65.2 147
1979 12.46 11.43 72.6 144
1980 14.39 14.03 82.4 124
1981 14.73 10.61 90.9 76
1982 12.26 8.61 96.5 93
1983 11.99 9.52 99.6 56
1984 11.17 7.48 103.9 40
1985 9.79 5.98 107.6 27
1986 8.95 5.78 109.6 10
1987 8.98 6.67 113.6 30
1988 9.81 8.11 118.3 25
1989 9.74 7.50 124.0 19
1990 9.07 5.38 130.7 14
1991 7.83 3.43 136.2 21
1992 6.93 3.02 140.3 22
1993 7.80 4.50 144.5 20
1994 6.50 3.50 148.2 18
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